RESTRICTED
WORLD TRADE G/TBT/W/50
5August 1997
ORGANIZATION(97-3314)
Original: Spanish Committee onTechnical Barriers toTrade
FIRST TRIENNIAL REVIEW OFTHE OPERATION AND IMPLEMENTATION
OFTHE AGREEMENT ONTECHNICAL BARRIERS TOTRADE
OFTHE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
Communication from Mexico
Thefollowing communication concerning theTriennial Review oftheAgreement onTechnical
Barriers toTrade, dated 9July1997, hasbeenreceived fromthePermanent Mission ofMexico with
therequest thatitbecirculated tothemembers oftheCommittee.
_______________
I. INTRODUCTION
1. Mexico considers thatinconducting theFirstTriennial Review oftheTBTAgreement, the
highest priority should begiven toexamining theimplementation byMembers ofthecurrent provisions
oftheAgreement andtheircompliance withthose provisions. Thisreview should beinitiated without
prejudgment astowhether ornotitisnecessary toamend inanywaytherights andobligations arising
from thesaidprovisions.
2. Iffollowing thisfirstreview theMembers wereinfactabletoreach aconsensus ontheneed
tomake certain adjustments inorder toobtain mutual economic advantages andtobalance theirrights
andobligations under theAgreement, Mexico would hopetoseethesubjects identified inthatconnection
included inawork programme withaview tofacilitating theCommittee 'sfuture discussions asto
thescope andform ofsuchadjustments.
3. Accordingly, Mexico seesthisfirstreview oftheAgreement astaking place intwostages:
- Thefirststage would consist inconducting athorough review ofthedegree of
acceptance oftheAgreement andimplementation ofitsprovisions bytheMembers;
- ifthatreview reveals recurring problems which callforpossible adjustments, inthe
Agreement, oftherights andobligations ofMembers, asecond stagewould betodraw
upawork programme asindicated above.
4. Theproposals recommending theadjustment oftherights andobligations arising from the
Agreement should beconsidered inthelightofthefourfollowing basic elements:
(a) They should bebased ontheexperience acquired inimplementing theAgreement;
i.e.,theyshould bethedirect result oftheprocess ofreviewing theAgreement which
constitutes thefirststage.G/TBT/W/50
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(b) They should address problems ofgeneral interest totheMembers oftheAgreement;
i.e.,theyshould reflect abroad interest, andnotnecessarily theinterests ofafew
individual Members.
(c) They should address horizontal issues; i.e.,theyshould avoid singling outspecific
sectors orareas inaddressing thedisciplines. Oneofthepositive aspects ofthe
TBTAgreement isthatitsrules anddisciplines areapplicable toallofthetechnical
regulations andtoallofthestandards adopted bytheMembers, regardless ofthe
political objective underlying them. Thesingling outofspecific sectors orareas (e.g.
item10oftheillustrative listsubmitted bytheChairman oftheCommittee) could be
contrary tothespirit andphilosophy oftheAgreement.
(d) They should takeaccount oftheprovisions ofArticle 12oftheAgreement regarding
special anddifferential treatment ofdeveloping country members.
II. IMPLEMENTATION OFTHE AGREEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY PROVISIONS
5. Mexico considers thatitisofvitalimportance toensure thatallMembers areuptodatein
thefulfilmentoftheirobligationswithrespecttotheimplementationoftheAgreement.Theseobligations
include, inparticular: (i)thesubmission ofstatements informing theCommittee ofmeasures inexistence
ortakentoensuretheimplementationandadministrationoftheAgreement(Article15.2);(ii)acceptance
ofandcompliance withtheCode ofGood Practice forthePreparation, Adoption andApplication of
Standards (referred tohereinafter asthe"Code ofGood Practice") bytheir central government
standardizing bodies (Article 4);and(iii)theadoption ofsuchmeasures asmaybeavailable tothem
toensure thatlocalgovernment andnon-governmental standardizing bodies within theirterritories,
aswellasregional standardizing bodies, accept andcomply withtheCode (Article 4).
6. Asthestatistical datacontained inthemostrecent report oftheTBTCommittee reveal, and
aspointed outbycertain other Members, theimplementation oftheTBT Agreement isfarfrom
satisfactory. Inorder tocorrect thissituation, itisurgent toidentify theproblems encountered by
theMembers,inparticularthenewadherentstotheTBTAgreement,incomplyingwiththeseobligations.
Byclearly identifying theproblems, theMembers would beabletopropose effective solutions. Given
theintrinsic novelty oftheCode ofGood Practice and,toacertain degree, ofthenewTBTAgreement,
particularly foritsnewMembers, itwould befairtoassume thatoneofthefirstproblems liesina
lackoffamiliarity withthem. Onepossible solution would betoorganize activities aimed atenhancing
thedissemination,amongusers,ofinformationregardingtheobjectivesandbenefitsoftheseinstruments.
7. Once theproblem ofimplementation inaccordance withexisting obligations issolved, i.e.
oncetheAgreement isbeing fullyimplemented byallMembers, itwould bepossible toassess the
needtomodify those obligations orcreate newobligations. Atthispoint, itwould bepremature (and
could prove counterproductive) totrytointroduce newobligations suchasthose proposed bycertain
Members withrespect toactivities involving theassessment ofmeasures adopted byMembers forthe
implementation andadministration oftheAgreement.
8. Asregards obligations withrespect tothenotification ofstandards, technical regulations and
conformity assessment procedures, Mexico agrees withtheMembers thatdonotbelieve intrying to
create more provisions inthatrespect. Asindicated bySingapore initscommunication, thenotification
obligations under theTBTAgreement areamong thebroadest andmost far-reaching inanyofthe
WTO Agreements (Articles 2.9.2, 2.10.1, 5.6.2, 5.7.1, 3.2and7.2). Inthistriennial review, our
priority must betoensure thefullandproper implementation ofexisting obligations, including
compliance withthetime-period agreed uponinorder togiveother Members theopportunity tosubmit
comments. Appropriate actions toenhance acceptance andcompliance withtheCode ofGood Practice,G/TBT/W/50
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assuggested above, would undoubtedly contribute toachieving thatobjective withrespect tostandards.
Asregards voluntary labelling standards ingeneral, Members should confirm thedecision oftheTokyo
Round TBTCode Committee concerning compulsory labelling requirements whereby thenotification
obligations oftheAgreement areapplicable toalltypesofcompulsory labelling requirements, regardless
ofthetypeofinformation communicated bythelabel.
III. OPERATION OFTHE AGREEMENT AND FULFILMENT OFITSOBJECTIVES
9. Mexico agrees withtheEuropean Community thattheroleoftheTBT Agreement asan
instrument fortheexchange ofinformation appears sofartohavetaken precedence overtherolethat
itshould playwithaviewtotheelimination oftechnical barriers totrade. Needless torecall, theprimary
objective andpurpose oftheAgreement istoensure thatthecompulsory technical regulations, the
voluntary standards andtheprocedures forassessment ofconformity donotbecome unnecessary barriers
totrade. While ontheonehand, wemust redouble ourefforts tocomply withourprocedural
commitments inrespect ofnotification andexchange ofinformation provided forbytheAgreement,
itisalsoessential nottolosesightofthesubstantive commitments, since itisthose commitments that
infactconstitute theraison d'êtreoftheAgreement.
10. Inthisconnection, Mexico alsoagrees thattheTBTCommittee, ontheoccasion ofthefirst
triennial review oftheAgreement, must undertake astudy ofthevarious approaches andelements
ofregulatory policy andtheirconsequences foraccess tothemarket. Twothemes arefundamental
tothestudy: international standards, andconformity assessment procedures.
(a) Theroleandeffects ofinternational standards
11. Anumber ofvirtues havebeenascribed tointernational standardization (seeparagraph 2of
Secretariat document 1771). Everyone agrees thatinprinciple, thepurpose ofdeveloping and
implementing international standards istofacilitate trade. Onthatbasis, WTO Members decided to
accept theprovisions ofArticles 2.4and5.4oftheTBTAgreement aswellasparagraph FoftheCode
ofGood Conduct, inwhich theyareinvited touseinternational standards ortherelevant partsofthem
asabasis fortheirtechnical regulations, theirconformity assessment procedures andtheirstandards,
except where suchinternational standards would beanineffective orinappropriate means forthe
fulfilment ofthelegitimate objectives pursued, orwhen (under Article 12.4) theyarenotcompatible
withtheirtechnical facilities andtheirdevelopment, financial andtrade needs. TheAgreement thus
promotestheuseofinternationalstandardsandprovidesdisciplinesfornationalandregionalstandardizing
bodies.
12. However, aspointed outbyJapan, theTBTAgreement doesnotprovide adefinition ofthe
term "international standard", nordoes itsupply anycriteria foridentifying the"international
standardizing bodies" towhich itrefers. Thissituation notonlycreates problems linked withthe
fulfilmentoftheAgreement,butmayalsogiverisetointerpretationsthatruncontrarytotheAgreement's
veryobjectives. Aninternational standard might beunderstood tobeonewhich isdeveloped bymore
thanonecountry, andthefactthatitmaynotreflect theviews orinterests ofthose whodidnot
participate initspreparation would notdeprive itofitsinternational character. Thisinterpretation
clearly would notreflect thespirit orobjectives oftheTBT Agreement, which hasmore than
120Members. Byitsverynature, theTBTAgreement requires thataninternational standard should
berecognized andaccepted assuchonlyifitcarries aguarantee thatallMembers interested inthe
matter towhich itrefers haveparticipated initspreparation andadoption. Indeed, astandard canonly
beaneffective instrument inthepromotion ofinternational tradetotheextent thatitcontains elements
contributed bydifferent countries atdifferent levels ofdevelopment.G/TBT/W/50
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13. Japan alsomentions initscommunication thattheAgreement contains areference inoneof
itsprovisions (Annex 1)toISO/IEC Guide 2,which contains general definitions relating to
standardization activities. ThisGuide defines theterm"international standard" asa"standard that
isadopted byaninternational standardizing/standards organization andmade available tothepublic".
TheGuide alsodefines an"international standardizing organization" asa"standardizing organization
whose membership isopentotherelevant national body from every country". (Emphasis added)
14. Asindicated inSecretariat document 1771, thefocus ofmost ofthe50orsointernational
standardizing bodies iseither issue-, sector- orproduct-specific. They generally group together
associationsorinstitutionsfromvariouscountries.Participationbycountry,althoughinprinciple"open"
toall,isrestricted byconstraints relating totheleveloftechnological development ofeachcountry
inagiven branch orsector. Thus, the"international" standards prepared bythese bodies arebased
ontheconcerns ofthose attheforefront oftechnological development. Although voluntary, these
standards areinpractice theinstruments governing themarket. Countries which forthereasons
mentionedabovecannotparticipateindraftingthestandardswillalmostcertainlyfallbehindincomplying
withthem, thereby losing ground inthemarkets towhich theyapply. Thisistheparticular situation
ofmany developing countries.
15. There arealsointernational organizations whose standardizing activities extend across agreat
variety ofsectors andactivities andwhich supposedly operate onthebasisof"openness" totherelevant
national bodies of"all"countries. However, theseorganizations provide noguarantee ofsuchopenness,
andinfact,anumber ofaspects ofthepractices andprocedures bywhich theyoperate reveal their
exceedingly closed nature:
(a) Tobegin with, thepreparation ofstandards inthese organizations isclearly based on
aprocess geared towards growing technological sophistication. Thissophistication
ismaking itincreasingly difficult formany countries, inparticular thedeveloping
countries lacking inhuman resources sufficiently qualified forthepurpose, togain
access tothese processes andparticipate effectively inthem.
Itisnotenough tohavethetechnicians whocanattend themeetings; those technicians
must alsobefamiliar withtheprocess bywhich thestandards were prepared, the
technical language andthelanguage inwhich theorganization works, nottomention
experience inparticipating ininternational meetings. Foranumber ofreasons this
isnotonlydifficult, itispractically impossible.
(b) Some ofthese organizations, forexample theISO,work simultaneously onavariety
ofsubjects, andonspecific topics within those subjects. Farfrombeing concentrated
inoneplace, thiswork isscattered throughout theworld. Countries wishing to
participate must beready tospend enormous sums ofmoney andtosupply anarmy
ofhuman resources thatnoamount oftechnical assistance could train. Furthermore,
thecostoftraining these human resources would impose anadditional burden onthe
development ofstandards atthenational level.
(c) Toaddtotheproblem, participation inthese organizations isbynomeans freeof
charge. Ithasacost,insome cases iscalculated according tothesizeofthecountry 's
economy, andinothercasesissimply astandard fee.Since theTBTAgreement neither
identifies theinternational standardizing organizations whose standards itrecommends
(asisthecaseintheAgreement ontheApplication ofSanitary andPhytosanitary
Measures)norprovidescriteriaforthisidentification,thecountriesmustdecidebetween
spending considerable amounts ofmoney andparticipating inalloftheorganizations
orselecting those which aremostimportant fromtheirparticular point ofview, attheG/TBT/W/50
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riskofseeing theirtrade negatively affected because theyhavestayed outofbodies
which mayhaveanimpact ontheirmarket access.
(d) Finally, andpartly asaresult oftheabove, wefindthattheprocess ofadopting
standards suffers fromthesame faults andshortcomings associated withtheproblems
involved inparticipating inthedrafting process. Indeed, weconstantly encounter
"international" standards approved byavoteoflessthanonethird ofthecountries
participating inthedrafting process, andinmost cases, those countries donoteven
account formore thanhalfthemembers ofthestandardizing organization drafting the
standards inquestion. Acalculation ofthepercentage ofoverall membership ofthe
TBTAgreementthatthisvoteandthisparticipationreflectswould,inmostcases,reveal
anextremely lowlevelofrepresentation.
16. Allofthisraises serious questions astothepresumption thatthetechnical regulations, standards
andconformity assessment procedures prepared, adopted orapplied inaccordance with"international
standards" (whatever theyare)donotcreate unnecessary obstacles tointernational trade. Where there
hasnotbeeneffective andsufficiently representative participation ofcountries withdifferent levels
ofdevelopment inthepreparation andadoption ofastandard, thatstandard cannot besaidtobetruly
"international". Thefailure togiveeffective consideration totheneeds andrealities ofthevarious
interested countries means thatinmost cases, thestandards issued reflect above alltheinterests of
theirpromoters who,asarule,bring considerable pressure tobearduring thepreparation andadoption
stages. These standards may, alsoasageneral rule,havenegative effects ontrade, inparticular (and
notsurprisingly) ontheexports ofthose countries which areunable toparticipate effectively intheir
preparation/adoption, forthemost partthedeveloping countries.
17. Thisreality surrounding thedevelopment ofinternational standardization callsforarevision
ofthespecial status currently accorded bytheTBTAgreement toall"international standards". The
problems described above cannot beresolved through isolated action, suchastheoffering oftechnical
assistance tothecountries concerned (however valuable andnecessary thatassistance maybe,it
sometimes serves above alltomask thetrueproblems). Thepurpose ofthisrevision should notbe
toeliminate thespecial status (Article 2.5),sincetheobjective ofpromoting international standardization
should continue toapply intheAgreement (Article 2.4); butthespecial status should beproperly
defined toensure thatitcovers onlythose standards thataretruly"international". Thedelay incarrying
outthisrevision isirremediably eroding oftheobjectives oftheTBTAgreement and,infact,rendering
theAgreement ineffectual. Indeed, asystem which requires countries, inconnection withtheabove
problems, toattend hundreds offorasimultaneously inorder todefend theireffective market access
rights raises serious doubts withrespect totherolethattheAgreement canplayinensuring that
standardization instruments andpolicies donotconstitute technical barriers totrade. Thisunfortunate
circumstance ismade worse bythefactthattheAgreement seems firstandforemost tobegiving its
stamp ofapproval tothesituation bygranting theabove-mentioned special status indiscriminately to
any"international standard".
18. Intheframework ofthisreview, wepropose thefollowing concrete steps:
- Inafirststage, thedevelopment ofaconcept of"international standard" acceptable
toallWTO Members. What isneeded isnotnecessarily adefinition assuch, buta
concept onthebasis ofwhich todevelop thecriteria needed toidentify, distinguish
andfollow uptheinternational standardization organizations whose standardization
activities arethemost representative attheinternational level.
- Inasecond stage, thesetting upofaworking group tofollow upthework carried
outinsuchorganizations, auditing thestandards inthelightofthecriteria bywhichG/TBT/W/50
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theyhavebeendefined. Itisthe"international" character ofastandard thatshould
justify itsbeing considered/invoked under theprovisions oftheTBT Agreement
conferring special status onthem, including thenotification commitments (interalia
Articles 2.4,2.5,2.9,5.4and5.6,aswellasparagraph FoftheCode ofGood
Conduct). Thisshould innowaybeseenasanexercise aimed atdiscrediting any
organization, butrather, asalegitimate effort tore-establish theobjectives oftheTBT
Agreement, andhence thebalance between therights andobligations ofitsMembers
inobtaining mutual economic advantages.
- Inaddition, wepropose thedrafting ofarecommendation fortheinternational
standardization organizations ingeneral, suggesting measures andactions aimed at
promoting trueopenness, transparency andrepresentativity intheir operational
procedures andpractices. These suggestions could include certain oftheproposals
made byJapan inpoint 5ofitscommunication aswellasothers tobeidentified by
theMembers asawhole. Anessential point forMexico would betosuggest limiting
asfaraspossible thedispersion ofthemeetings/work oforganizations suchastheISO
(seeparagraph15(ii)above).Thiswouldhelpenormouslyintryingtosolvetheproblem
ofparticipation. Thesame recommendation should place emphasis onconsensus as
aconditiontobegivenincreasingimportanceinproceduresfortheadoptionofstandards
insuchorganizations.
(b) Procedures forassessment ofconformity
19. Added totheproblem ofparticipation described above istheproblem ofcertification. Itis
notenough thatacountry should fulfil thecriteria established byaninternational standard (whether
ornotithasparticipated initspreparation/adoption), itmustalsocertify conformity withthatstandard
inorder toenter intothemarkets.
20. Mexico agrees withother Members thatthemanufacturer 'sdeclaration ofconformity isthe
formofcertification which hastheleastrestrictive effects ontrade. However, thisformofcertification
islessandlessaccepted intoday'smarket place. Second-party assessment ,i.e.assessment bythe
certification authorities ofthemanufacturing country orthepurchasing country, isoftenused. However,
eachpurchaser tends torequest individual certifications, andthiscreates newburdens andbarriers
totrade. Theresult isanincreasingly predominant tendency inthemarket torequire third-party
assessment tocertify conformity. Thistypeofcertification isperhaps themoststrictandcumbersome,
andisalsocreating newburdens andbarriers totrade. Added tothisisthefactthatinmany cases,
those whoparticipate mosteffectively inthedrafting of"international" standards arerepresentatives
oftheprivate certification bodies themselves (i.e.,thethirdparties ).Andyet,thecertification process
remains separate from thestandardizing bodies, afactwhich makes itconsiderably more difficult to
establish mutual recognition between countries forcertification.
21. Thesecircumstancesaregivingrisetotwotypesofsituation:first,asituationinwhichexporting
firms areforced tomeetmultiple certification requirements depending onthemarket theywishtoenter,
including theirownmarket (thedegree ofacceptance ofproducts depends increasingly onconsumer
recognition ofsymbols ontheirlabelling which provide proof ofcertification). Second, there isthe
situation inwhich exporters haverecourse totheservices ofmultinational certification companies (third
parties )which, since theyarerecognized inanumber ofcountries, charge significantly higher prices
fortheirservices. While forthelargeenterprises, thesesituations canrepresent aburden andaserious
barrier totrade, forthesmall andmedium enterprises theyhavetheeffect ofpractically excluding
them from themarket.G/TBT/W/50
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22. Mexico agrees withCanada andother Members ontheneed toensure the"portability of
certification". Asolution must befound totheproblems created bytheproliferation ofassessment
andcertification requirements inthedifferent markets andtothemonopoly situation thatistending
todevelop inthatarea. Inaddition totheproposals made byCanada initscommunication tothe
Committee onthesubject, Mexico proposes that:
- Apoint beincluded intherecommendation tointernational standardizing bodies
proposed inparagraph 18above emphasizing theneed forthose organizations to
incorporate thecertification criteria andprocesses inorder toremove thetradebarriers
created bythecurrent disorder inthatarea. Thiscould beachieved, forexample, by
setting upamultilateral system ofrecognition ofcertification bodies bringing together
andharmonizing thecriteria applied byeachoneofthem(such astheonethattheISO
plans todevelop forquality systems known as"QSAR" (Quality System Assessment
Recognition Programme). Thiswould remove theneed forregional bilateral or
plurilateral agreements andenhance theimage andcredibility oftheinternational
organization.
23. Asregards thework oftheTechnical Working Group established bytheTBTCommittee to
study theISO/IEC guides onconformity assessment, Mexico isoftheopinion thattheCommittee should
nottakeanydecision regarding theendorsement oftheguides before ithasaclearer ideaofthe
consequences oftransforming some oftheminto"international standards". Thisshould beexamined
inthelightoftheproblem raised insection (a)above.