RESTRICTED
WORLD TRADE G/ADP/W/47
G/SCM/W/56
ORGANIZATION 15August 1995
(95-2399)
Original: English Committee onAnti-Dumping Practices
Committee onSubsidies andCountervailing Measures
ORAL QUESTIONS POSED ATTHE JOINT SPECIAL MEETING
OFTHE COMMITTEES CONCERNING THE NOTIFICATIONS
PROVIDED BYTHE GOVERNMENT OFAUSTRALIA OFLAWS AND
REGULATIONS UNDER ARTICLES 18.5AND 32.6OFTHE AGREEMENTS
Thefollowingcommunication,dated19July1995,hasbeenreceivedfromthePermanentMission
ofThailand.
_______________
TheMission ofThailand would liketosubmit thewritten questions raised on18-19 July1995
inthereview session oftheanti-dumping andthecountervailing measures lawandregulations notified
byAustralia under Article 18.5oftheAnti-Dumping Agreement andArticle 32.6oftheSubsidies
andCountervailing Measures Agreement.
TheThaiMissionwouldappreciateverymuchifthesequestionsareforwardedtotheappropriate
delegates andalsolikestoreserve theright toreceive thecorresponding written replies, aswellas
therighttomake follow-up enquiries during thenextsession ofthemeeting oftheCommittee toreview
thewritten questions andreplies.G/ADP/W/47
G/SCM/W/56
Page2
1. Excluded subsidies
TheSubsidies Agreement specifically provides thattheexemption ofanexported product from
duties ortaxes borne bythelikeproduct when destined fordomestic consumption, ortheremission
ofsuchduties ortaxes inamounts notinexcess ofthose which haveaccrued, shallnotbedeemed
tobeasubsidy (seeArticle 1.1(a)(1)(ii)(Footnote 1)andAnnexes IandII.
Australianlaw,however,doesnotappeartomakeanyprovisionfortheexclusionfromactionable
subsidies ofsuchexemption orremission ofduties andtaxes. SeeSection 269TAAC (1)(b) and(6)
oftheCustoms Act1901.
Question : Please explain whether Australian lawensures thatsuchexemption orremission of
duties andtaxes willnotbetreated asanactionable subsidy.
2. Opportunity ofparties tosubmit relevant information
Article6.1oftheAnti-DumpingAgreementprovidesthatallinterestedpartiesinananti-dumping
investigation "shall begiven notice oftheinformation which theauthority require andample opportunity
topresent inwriting allevidence which theyconsider relevant inrespect oftheinvestigation inquestion."
TheAustralian authority language which appears most applicable tothisWTO requirement
isSection 269TC(4)(e) oftheCustoms Act1901. Thissection stipulates thataftertheComptroller
hasdecided toaccept adumping application, theComptroller mustinvite theinterested parties tolodge
(within 40daysafterthedateofinitiation ofaninvestigation) "submission concerning thepublication
ofthenotice sought bytheapplication".
Because theAustralian statute doesnotmandate theuseofquestionnaires inanti-dumping
investigations, andbecause interested parties areinvited tosubmit evidence concerning thepublished
notice, itisunclear whether aforeign exporter willknow exactly whatinformation theauthority will
require inmaking theiranti-dumping determination. Thislackofinstruction maynotmeetthenotice
requirement ofArticle 6oftheA-DAgreement.
Question : Please reconcile theprovision oftheAustralian lawwiththeAnti-Dumping Agreement?
3. Disclosure ofthebasis decision
Article 6.9oftheAnti-Dumping Agreement specifies that"theauthorities shall, before afinal
determination ismade, inform allinterested parties oftheessential factsunder consideration which
formthebasisforthedecision whether toapply definitive measures", andthatsuchdisclosure should
takeplace insufficient timefortheparties todefend theirinterest.
Under Section 269TG(3D) oftheCustoms Act1901, theMinister hastheauthority before
publishing adumping dutynotice togivenotice toanexporter thatitwould beappropriate toundertake
action soastoavoid causing orthreatening material injury toanAustralian industry producing like
products. Thisprovision, however, mayfailtomeettheAnti-Dumping Agreement requirement for
thefollowing reasons:
(i) Itisnotmandatory, butmerely permissive.
(ii) Itisnotdesigned toinform "interested parties oftheessential factsunder consideration
which form thebasis forthedecision".G/ADP/W/47
G/SCM/W/56
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(iii) Itdoesnotprovide asufficient opportunity fortheparties todefend theirinterest.
Forexample, oneofthepurposes ofpre-determination disclosure istoensure thatministerial
errors donotleadtothemiscalculation ofdumping margins. Iftheinterested parties arenotprovided
withanopportunity tocorrect clerical errors, theymight unnecessarily suffer significant commercial
consequences.
Question : HowdoestheAustralian authority meetthedisclosure requirement under Article 6.9
oftheAnti-Dumping Agreement?