RESTRICTED
WORLD TRADE G/AG/W/12
7November 1995
ORGANIZATION(95-3444)
Committee onAgriculture
DECISION ONMEASURES CONCERNING THE POSSIBLE NEGATIVE
EFFECTS OFTHE REFORM PROGRAMME ONLEAST-DEVELOPED
AND NET FOOD-IMPORTING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL 'SCONSULTATIONS WITH
THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
FUND AND THE WORLD BANK
Note bytheSecretariat
Inresponse totherequest made inthisregard atthemeeting oftheCommittee onAgriculture
on28-29 September 1995, theDirector-General inhisrecent consultations withtheManaging Director
oftheInternational Monetary Fund andthePresident oftheWorld Bank raised anumber ofquestions
concerning theirrespective contributions tothefollow-up under paragraph 5oftheMinisterial Decision
oftheLeast -Developed andNetFood-Importing Developing Countries. Thequestions raised bythe
Director-General were asfollows:
(i) Whether theIMF/World Bank could envisage giving net-food importing developing
countries some degree ofpriority inaccess toexisting facilities;
(ii) whether anysoftening ofconditionality could beenvisaged inthecaseofnetfood
importers thatfaceUruguay Round-related problems;
(iii) what areprospects forestablishing anynewfacilities withthespecific objective of
assisting netfoodimporters incoping withsuchadjustment problems;
(iv) inwhich ways could theWTO assist anyefforts inthepartoftheIMF/World Bank
tobeforthcoming inthismatter.
ThePresident oftheWorld Bank'sresponse tothese questions aresetoutintheattachment
hereto andareforconsideration inthecontext oftheCommittee 'smonitoring ofthefollow-up tothe
Decision atthenextmeeting oftheCommittee on20-21 November 1995. TheIMF'sresponse to
these questions would asappropriate bemade available prior tooratthemeeting oftheCommittee.
TheIMFandtheWorld Bank havebeeninvited toberepresented asobservers forthediscussion on
thesubject attheNovember meeting oftheCommittee.G/AG/W/12
Page2
ATTACHMENT
TheWorld Bank'sContribution toFollow-up ontheUruguay Round Decision
onMeasures Concerning thePossible Negative Effects ofthe
Reform Programme onLeast-Developed and
NetFood-Importing Countries
Response toMr.Ruggiero 'sQuestions
TheWorldBankisattentivetotheproblemsoftheNetFood-Importers,monitoringtheirsituation
bothinthecontext ofworld grain markets andthrough itsregular country dialogue. Itrecognizes
thatincreases inworld foodprices bothraisethefinancing needs onnet-food importing countries and
create newopportunities forinvestment thatwillcontribute totheirlonger-term development. Itis
important tonote, however, that,based onanalysis conducted within theBank, theWTO andother
organizations, theBank believes thattheimpact oftheUruguay Round onworld foodprices willbe
verysmall, especially relative totheirnormal fluctuations.1
Given thesmall sizeoftheshock andtheBank'ssubstantial headroom above current IBRD
loans outstanding, itseems clearthattheBank willbeinaposition tomeetanyconceivable demand
generated bytheRound forloans onIBRD terms. Itsability toassist thepoorest countries on
concessional terms, ontheother hand, willdepend upon thewillingness ofmember governments to
replenish IDA. Unless donor countries maintain support forIDA, theBank'sability toassist poor
countries facing serious adjustment pressures fromfoodpricerises, oranyothercauses, willbeseverely
diminished.
TheBank'sresponses tothefourspecific questions posed byMr.Ruggiero areasfollows:
(i) Ingeneral, thepriority thatacountry receives forWorld Bank lending isdetermined
byitsoverall need andthecontribution thattheBank canmake toitslong-term
development. These areassessed paying regard tobothcountry-specific andglobal
factors. Forexample, ifasaresult oftheconclusion oftheUruguay Round acountry
weretoundertake asound liberalization ofitsagricultural ortrade policies, andifit
required assistance indealing withtheresulting transition costs, support would be
forthcoming because ofthecontribution ofliberalization todevelopment.
(ii) Theconditionality associated withWorld Bank lending isdesigned tofacilitate the
successful outcome andhighdevelopment impact oftheproject orpolicy reform in
question. Thusrelaxing orwaiving conditionality ismore likely tohinder thantohelp
economic andsocial development. Conditionality iscentral toachieving effective
adjustment, andtheBank should lendonlyagainst sound projects andeffective
adjustment programmes.
(iii) Therange offacilities available fromtheWorld Bank, theInternational Monetary Fund
andtheWorld Food Program issummarized intheappended paper on"Coping with
Rising World Grain Prices". Given thisrange, itdoesnotseem necessary toestablish
aspecial Uruguay Round adjustment facility. Even though there maybeimportant
impacts oftheRound onparticular netfood-importing countries, these willbecome
evident inthecontext oftheBank'songoing dialogues withmember countries andthe
1Therecent sharp increases inworld grain prices arenotduetotheUruguay Round, deriving instead, from
factors such ascrop failures andlowstock levels.G/AG/W/12
Page3
totalborrowing needs theygiverisetoarelikely tobeverysmall relative tothepotential
lending oftheinternational financial institutions. Moreover, anyfunds allocated to
suchaspecial facility would necessarily besubtracted from those available forthe
countries withthegreatest overall need.
(iv) TheWorld Bank welcomes dialogue withtheWTO onidentifying areas inwhich they
canbeofassistance toBank member countries. Interms ofimmediate cooperation,
itplaces particular value onthecollaborative research currently being discussed by
staffoftheBank andtheWTO Secretariat ontheimplications oftheUruguay Round
forAfrica -aregion where net-food importing problems loom particularly large.G/AG/W/12
Page4
COPING WITH RISING WORLD GRAIN PRICES2
World grain prices haverisensharply overthelastseveral months andfurther price increases
arepossiblebecauseoflowworldstocksandpoorgrowingconditionsinseveralmajorproducingregions.
Highprices areexpected tolastforthenextyearandpossibly thenexttwoyears. Theprice increases
willsignificantly raiseimport costsformany countries. Forexample, thecostofwheat imports in1995
would riseby60percentfrom1994levels based onrecent price increases andlower export subsidies
frommajorexporters.Thisnotediscussesissuesandoptionstoassistcountriestodealwiththesituation.
Introduction
Anunusual combination ofevents havecome together tomake grain prices risesharply this
year.Theseeventsinclude:(i)thelowestlevelofworldgrainstocksrelativetoconsumptionsince1974;
(ii)higher fertilizer prices during therecent planting season inthenorthern hemisphere which will
reduce yields; and(iii)apoorstarttothegrowing season intheUnited States, China, andRussia.
Thissituation occurs atatimewhen adrought hasreduced foodproduction bynearly onethirdinsome
countries inSouthern Africa; many oftheRepublics oftheFSUarerelying onfoodaidtooffset
collapsing foodproduction; andfoodaidavailability isdeclining.
Wheat prices haveincreased from$3.42/bushel inMarch toarecent highof$4.85 forDecember
futures, anincrease of43percent. Corn futures prices haveincreased from $2.55/bushel inMarch
to$3.00. Riceprices haveincreased by$40/ton injustthelastmonth duetostrong demand andlow
ricestocks forexport inAsia. Further price increases canbeexpected ifthegrowing conditions do
notdramatically improve. Current price increases willleadtohigher import costsformany countries
andhigherpriceswillalsoreducetheavailabilityofexportsubsidiesfrommajorexporters.Forexample,
thef.o.b. price ofUSwheat hasincreased from $140/ton inMarch 1994 to$159/ton inJune1995
andtheUSexport subsidy hasdeclined from $49/ton to$14/ton.
Thisnoteisintended toprovide information about programmes available fromtheIMF, the
World Bank andtheWorld Food Programme todealwithasharp riseingrain prices suchasweare
nowexperiencing. These facilities should berelied upon toassist countries tocopewithrising grain
import costs rather thanallowing countries topursue policies which cancause longer termdamage
toinvestment programmes andeconomic growth, suchasexport restrictions, ortoallow hunger and
malnutrition toincrease.
Which countries willbemost affected
Nearly alldeveloping countries import grain andwillbeaffected. Atthisstage theprice
increases havebeenlargest inwheat andthose countries whoimport wheat willbemost affected.
However, maize andriceprices havealsobegun toincrease andareexpected tocontinue increasing.
Beyond thegeneral increase inimport costs, those countries which alsohaveproduction problems will
beseverely affected. (FAO 'sestimates ofimport requirements forindividual countries areattached
tothisdocument.)
2Technical staffs from theWorld Food Programme (WFP), theFood andAgriculture Organization ofthe
UnitedNations(FAO),theInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF),andtheWorldBank(WB)haveformedaninformal
coordinating committee tomonitor thesituation. Thisnotewasprepared byHans Binswanger (AGRDR) and
Donald Mitchell (IECCP) under thedirection ofAlex McCalla (AGRDR). Numerous stafffrom theWB,IMF,
FAO andWEP commented orcontributed tothisnote, butanyerrors oromissions aretheresponsibility ofthe
authors.G/AG/W/12
Page5
Theearly warning systems ofFAO andUSDA indicate thatcountries inSouthern Africa and
Northern Africa havesevere problems thisyear. Themostsevere production problems areinSouthern
Africa where widespread drought hasadversely affected foodcropproduction according toFAO/WFP
Crop andFood Supply Assessment Missions. Theaggregate 1995 cereal output inthe11Southern
Africa Development Community (SADC) member countries isestimated tobeabout onethirdbelow
theprevious year'sharvest and20percentbelow normal. Production inNorthern Africa isalsopoor
withthewinter grain cropnowbeing harvested expected tobesharply below average inMorocco and
Tunisia, while Algeria expects anabove normal cropandEgypt expects toharvest arecord crop.
Morocco hasbeenhitbytheworst drought indecades according toFAO.
Policies toensure foodaccess ofthepoorduring aspike
Poorconsumers spend over70percentoftheirincome onfoodinmany lowincome countries.
Insuchcountries, itisappropriate topartially insulate thepoorfromtheinternational foodprice rises
orcompensatetheirpurchasingpowertoensureaccesstofoodandpreventhunger.Appropriatedomestic
mechanisms could include employment generation programmes orwelltargeted foodsubsidies forthe
poor. Government heldfoodstocks could bereleased intothemarket inorder tolimitprice risesand
thegovernment could partially finance imports. Food availability canalsobeincreased viaadditional
concessional imports orfoodaid.Unfortunately acommodity boom oftenreduces thequantity offood
aidavailable. Where prices ofother tradeable foods which areimportant tothepoor, suchassugar,
areprotected, tradecould beliberalized toreduce domestic prices andprovide acompensating increase
inpurchasing power. Ifsuchoptions andprogrammes arenotused, countries arelikely toresort to
more drastic means, such asexport restrictions, orsubsidization offood prices with adverse
macroeconomic consequences.
Caremustbetaken inshort-term foodprice spikes tomake surethatbothpurchasing power
ofthepoorandthefoodsupply areincreased simultaneously. Ifpurchasing power alone isincreased
(e.g.through foodstamps), thenfoodprices willinflate andtheconsumption effect willbeminimal.
Iffoodsupply alone isincreased (through commercial imports ormonetized foodaid),prices may
notrisebutthepoorwillstilllackthepurchasing power tobuythefood.
Food aid
Food aidisavailable tohelpsome countries which suffer asevere drought orother problems
which create afoodimport requirement. However, thequantities offoodaidarenotsufficient tomeet
theimport needs ofmany countries. In1994, only5percentofworld grain imports were shipped
asfoodaid.Among developing countries, foodaidprovided 11percentofgrain imports. Most of
thefoodaidisbeing usedforrefugee andemergency relief, which reduces foodaidavailable tohelp
countries experiencing droughts orcountries withgreater thannormal needduetorising world market
prices.
Food aidisdistributed through bilateral andmultilateral channels, withbilateral deliveries
typically accounting forabout twothirds offoodaidandtheremaining deliveries through multilateral
channels. TheWorld Food Programme accounts formostofthefoodaiddelivered through multilateral
channels. In1994, theWorld Food Programme delivered 4.0million tons,ofwhich 1.5million tons
wereprocured indeveloping countries. TheWFP alsohandles theshipment offoodformany bilateral
donors onacontract basis. Theavailability offoodaidthisyearandfortheforeseeable future is
expected todecline duetobudget reductions ofthemajor donors.G/AG/W/12
Page6
IMFassistance intheevent ofacereal price shock
TheIMFistheleadorganizationinprovidingbalance-of-paymentsfinancing,includingincreases
inthecostofcereal imports. TheIMFhastwobasicmodes ofproviding financial assistance tomember
countries intheevent theyexperience balance-of-payments difficulties resulting from arisein
international cereals prices: (a)theCompensatory andContingency Financing Facility (CCFF) and
(b)Fund arrangements.
Compensatory andContingency Financing Facility (CCFF)
TheCCFF isaspecial facility thatprovides financial assistance tomembers experiencing
balance-of-payments difficulties arising fromshortfalls inexport receipts orexcess cereal import costs.
Recent purchases under thecereal element oftheCCFF havebeenmade byAlgeria, Moldova, and
South Africa. The"response time" fromacaseinvolving aCCFF purchase request could beasquick
astwoorthree months andapurchase canbeinanticipation ofaprojected excess incereal import
costs.
Toqualify forcompensatory financing, theexcess incereal import costs mustbetemporary,
largely beyond thecontrol ofthemember, andresult inaneedforbalance-of-payments financing.
Theallowable amount ofapurchase request under theCCFF isthelesser ofthecompensable cereal
import costexcess andtheapplicable access limitunder thefacility. Thecompensable excess isthe
amount bywhich thevalue ofcereal imports inthe"excess year" exceeds thearithmetic average of
thevalue ofcereal imports forthefive-year period centred ontheexcess year. Access limits under
thefacility varydepending onwhether themember 'sbalance-of-payments difficulties extend beyond
thesource oftheshock andwhether themember hasasatisfactory record ofcooperation withtheFund.
Ifthemember 'sbalance-of-payments position issatisfactory apartfromtheexcess cereal import costs,
access under thecereal element isupto65percentofthemember 'squota. Ifthemember 's
balance-of-payment difficulties extend beyond theexcess cereal import costs, access islimited to
15-35percentofquota,dependingonthemember'srecordofcooperationwiththeFundandthestrength
ofthemember 'seconomic policies.
Repurchase terms andcharges under theCCFF arethesameasthose under thecredit tranches:
Repurchases aredue3¼to5years afterapurchase ismade, andtherateofcharge isequal tothe
rateofcharge ontheFund'sgeneral resources, currently about 5percentperannum. Purchases under
theCCFF areadditional toresources available under Fund arrangements.
Fund arrangements
Balance-of-payments assistance canalsobeprovided under stand-by orextended arrangements
and,forlowincome countries, under theEnhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF), which
provides resources onconcessional terms. Fund arrangements canprovide forflexibility inthecase
ofun-anticipated external terms oftrade shocks, suchashigher prices forcereal imports, through the
inclusion ofacontingency mechanism and/or through augmentation ofaccess under anarrangement.
Contingency mechanisms normally provide foracombination offinancing andadjustment in
policies intheevent ofunanticipated exogenous developments. Forexample, inthecaseof
higher-than-programmed import costsowing toasharp riseinworld cereals prices, aprogramme could
allow forautomatic adjustment inprogramme targets toaccommodate allorsome proportion ofthe
increased import costs. TheFund'sExecutive Board hasstressed theimportance ofgreater useof
contingency mechanisms toprotect programmes against adverse shocks (aswellastopreserve some
ofthegains offavourable shocks). Since 1990, suchmechanisms havebeenincluded in10ESAF
arrangements. Ofthese, Lesotho hadacontingency mechanism related tocereal import costs.G/AG/W/12
Page7
TheFund alsostands ready toconsider augmenting access order fundarrangements onatimely
basis, when appropriate, tohelpcountries meetadverse exogenous shocks. Insuchacase,thecountry
authorities andtheFund would reassess theadjustment andfinancing needs astheprogramme unfolds,
either atthetimeofamid-term review orattherequest ofthemember. Inreviewing access, the
availability ofadditional donor financing (including foodaid)tocopewiththeshocks istaken into
account. Thus far,there havebeenseven cases ofaugmentation access under ESAF arrangements,
including forMozambique in1992 related tomaize imports.
World Bank assistance withfoodavailability
TheBank canalsoassist inincreasing thefinancing capacity ofcountries toimport foods, but
itsroleisusually asubsidiary onetotheIMF. TheBank hasbeenabletofacilitate overcoming food
shortages orhighfoodprices inanumber ofways. Thisisnotoutside itsmandate, especially not
incases where acountry needs toimport foodbecause ofaspecific combination ofevents, andwhere
failure todosocanderail hard-won improvements inmacroeconomic management andsectoral policies.
Themost common bank action inthefaceoffoodshortages caused bydrought hasbeento
modify project expenditures inorder tofacilitate acountry 'scapacity todealwithadrought. Inthis
case,thegovernment andtheBankagree toreallocate funds inexisting projects tofinance actions needed
torespond tothedrought. Inmostcases, thisdoesnotinclude direct purchase offood, butsince the
funds areoften inforeign exchange, which isfungible, governments areoften abletoindirectly use
thefunds tofinance food. More often thefunds areusedtofinance transport, storage, spare parts,
water supply orother usesimportant tothemovement orutilization offood. Examples ofthiswere
common intheBank'sresponse totheSouthern Africa drought in1992.
Economic Recovery Loans (ERLs) often come aftertheevent, butareusually usedtofinance
transport, seeds, fertilizer, etc.,which facilitate thecapacity ofthecountry oraffected farmers toprepare
forthefollowing year'scrop. Suchloans orcredits havebeenusedinEthiopia, Kenya, Somalia and
Sudan. They were usedduring the1974 and1985 droughts intheSahel andHorn ofAfrica.
Thesizeable Economic Recovery Credit forZimbabwe, asapartoftheBank'sresponse to
the1992drought ($200 million, combined withother funds reallocations tototalroughly $350million)
wasusedtodealwithmultiple elements oftheresponse tothedrought. Probably themajor contributions
oftheBank'stotalfinancing forthatoperation, however, wasthatisprovided balance-of-payment
support (atleastindirectly) thatenabled thegovernment todomany things, including import foodthat
werenotanexplicit partoftheproject. Infact,amajor motivation fortheBank'saction wastosustain
thestructural adjustment programme thatwasjuststarting.
Averyimportant benefit ofBank actions hasnotbeenthedirect elements financed, butthe
indirect element ofproviding balance-of-payments support, which enables countries toimport food,
medicine andother essentials, which areoftendriven outbythelossofexports andneedforemergency
imports, which characterize drought periods orinternational foodprice spikes.
Also,theBankcouldstructuremanyofitsprojects,especiallyinagricultureandindrought-prone
areas, sothattheycould beexpanded ormodified tohelptheproject areacopewiththedrought. There
could bespecific project components thatwould onlybeactivated incaseofdroughts. Thiswould
enable acountry tobegin toactattheearly stages ofthedrought andstaywiththelocalcommunities
throughout thedrought. Most ofourprojects tendtobewiped out,orseriously setbackbydroughts
(Sudan isanexample).
Finally, animportant action theBank cantakeinthefuture istobuild drought planning into
itscountry strategies incountries where droughts arerelatively frequent. Insuchcases, theBankshouldG/AG/W/12
Page8
haveaclear policy about whatpreparation itwillsupport before these events occur, whatitwilldo
inthecaseofdroughts ofdifferent magnitudes, andwhatitwilldoforrecovery. Atpresent, most
Bank concern iswiththelatter. Droughts aretreated asanunexpected event which theyarenotin
many drought-prone countries. Infact,growth projections forsuchcountries should consider theimpact
ofdroughts.
World Food Programme assistance
TheWorld Food Programme, thefoodaidarmoftheUnited Nations, responds toemergency
needs caused byfoodpricehikes orother disruptions infoodsupply andaccess. WFP works tocombat
acute hunger byorganizing fastdelivery ofrelief foodtopeople affected bynatural orhuman disasters
andpromotes long-term development inpoorest countries bysupplying targeted foodaidinsupport
ofactivities toenhance human resources andphysical infrastructure.
Toprevent hunger andstarvation, WFP stands ready toidentify needs, andincollaboration
withhostgovernments andother agencies, tohelpsupply foodtodistressed populations attheoutset
ofanemergency. Thiscanbeachieved through thedistribution ofemergency foodrations totargeted
populations, implementation ofsupplementary feeding programmes, assistance indrawing down
emergency food reserves, and/or intheform of(food) wages transferred toparticipants of
labour-intensive work projects.
WFP alsodevotes equal attention totheimportance oflaying thefoundation forlonger-term
development, byfostering conditions forhuman andcapital assetenhancement during andaftermajor
emergencies. Inmany countries, thereturn andresettlement ofrefugees andinternally displaced people
isdependent onWFP assistance. Labour-intensive work programmes support thereconstruction of
infrastructure, therestoration ofbasicservices andtraining activities thatpromote greater foodsecurity
andself-reliance.
Donor coordination
Animportant contribution intimes ofimpending emergency, suchasthedrought inSouthern
Africa in1992-93 isthewillingness ofinstitutions, suchastheWorld Bank, WFP, FAO, SADAC,
USAID andtheUnited Nations High Commissioner forRefugees (UNHCR) tomove quickly andto
coordinate theirefforts. Inthefaceoftheimpending 1992 drought inSouthern Africa, allofthese
agencies sentearly assessment teams totheSouthern Africa region toassess thesituation, determine
thenature ofthefoodandfinancial resources necessitated bythedrought, toanalyse thelogistical
problems andcapabilities oftheaffected countries, andtoorganize timely donor meetings toensure
theprojects were inplace andthattheneeded resources were available.
Asaresult oftheirjointefforts -which reflected awillingness bycountries andagencies to
shorten andcoordinate theirindividual actions inaneffort tomatch theregional problem withan
appropriate response -more than10million tonsofadditional foodandover$800million infinancial
resources were putinplace inadvance oftheworst impacts ofthedrought. Asaresult, the1992
drought, while ithadserious adverse effects onSouthern Africa, didnotresult infamine. Fewifany
liveswere lostasadirect result ofthedrought.
Theimportance ofearly andeffective coordination isasmuch attitudinal asitisprocess.
Agencies needtoreinforce existing processes byquick andaccurate assessments andawillingness
tosubordinate processes andprocedures totheneedforearly andeffective actions. Inthecaseof
theSouth African drought, theWorld Bank wasprepared toputitsstaffandfinancial resources at
theservice ofhigher coordinated responses andtosupport andadvise theactions ofothers.G/AG/W/12
Page9
Contacts
Foradditional information onspecific programmes orfacilities, please contact:
Mr.Hans Binswanger
Senior Agricultural Policy Advisor
Agriculture andNatural Resources Department
TheWorld Bank
Tel: 202-473-1871
Ms.AnnMcGuirk
Chief, Special Facilities andIssues Division
Policy Development andReview Department
International Monetary Fund
Tel: 202-623-8363
Mr.Patrick Webb
Policy Analyst
Policy andPublic Affairs Division
World Food Programme
Tel: 39-6-5228-2622G/AG/W/12
Page10
Estimated Import Requirements ofCereals: Low-Income Food-Deficit Countries1(thousand tons)
(a)Estimates for1994/95 or1995
Country Marketing
year1993/94 or1994 1994/95 or1995
Actual imports Import position
Commer-
cial
purchasesFood
aidTotal
commercial
andaidTotal
import
require-
ments
(excluding
re-exports)Total
commer-
cialand
aidFood aid
allocated
committed
orshippedCommercial
purchases
AFRICA 18,229.3 4,309.7 22,539.0 20,750 18,845.7 3,150.8 15,714.9
Northern
Africa 19,777.0 325.9 11,102.9 10,605 10,698.2 226.4 10,471.8
Egypt July/June 7,921.2 181.7 8,102.9 8,505 8,598.2 158.8 8,439.4
Morocco July/June 2,855.8 144.2 3,000.0 2,100 2,100.0 67.6 2,032.4
Eastern
Africa 2,299.5 2,173.8 4,473.3 2,859 2,129.9 1,235.5 893.5
Burundi Jan./Dec. 29.9 96.0 125.9 46 12.9 12.9 0.0
Comoros Jan./Dec. 36.9 6.1 43.0 44 4.6 2.3 2.3
Djibouti Jan./Dec. 113.8 10.6 124.4 82 20.9 8.9 12.0
Eritrea Jan./Dec. 33.0 287.2 370.2 50 29.6 29.6 0.0
Ethiopia2Jan./Dec. 53.0 925.1 976.1 964 495.9 495.8 0.1
Kenya July/June 1,365.8 300.4 1,666.2 290 586.6 156.1 430.5
Rwanda Jan./Dec. 0.0 199.4 199.4 131 220.7 220.7 0.0
Somalia July/June 34.1 88.8 122.1 295 136.7 66.4 70.3
Sudan Nov./Oct. 445.4 219.2 664.6 475 137.0 55.4 81.6
Tanzania June/May 118.6 19.3 137.9 435 434.8 145.9 288.9
Uganda Jan./Dec. 19.0 24.5 43.5 47 49.3 41.5 7.8
Southern
Africa 1,031.9 952.2 1,984.1 2,651 2,710.7 973.8 1,736.9
Angola April/Mar. 59.9 193.1 253.0 560 560.0 296.7 263.3
Lesotho April/Mar. 214.3 28.1 242.4 204 204.0 32.0 172.0
Madagascar Jan./Dec. 81.4 33.2 114.6 178 200.4 23.4 177.6
Malawi April/Mar. 84.3 160.8 245.1 493 492.0 279.0 212.3
Mozambique May/April 109.7 437.8 547.5 600 600.0 324.2 275.8
Swaziland May/April 47.1 22.0 69.1 76 76.0 8.7 67.3
Zambia May/April 2.9 8.8 11.7 390 390.0 3.9 386.1
Zimbabwe April/Mar. 432.3 68.4 500.7 150 188.3 5.2 183.1
Western
Africa 3,470.2 744.9 4,215.1 4,092 2,869.5 607.6 2,261.9
Coastal
Countries 2,330.4 502.1 2,832.5 2,693 2,251.7 357.0 1,894.7
(cont'd)G/AG/W/12
Page11
Country Marketing
year1993/94 or1994 1994/95 or1995
Actual imports Import position
Commer-
cial
purchasesFood
aidTotal
commercial
andaidTotal
import
require-
ments
(excluding
re-exports)Total
commer-
cialand
aidFood aid
allocated
committed
orshippedCommercial
purchases
Benin Jan./Dec. 80.5 17.4 97.9 96 98.5 12.3 86.2
Côted'Ivoire July/June 332.8 47.6 380.4 500 500.0 62.3 437.7
Ghana Oct./Sept. 169.6 141.6 311.2 275 274.5 91.8 182.7
Guinea Jan./Dec. 121.4 85.6 207.0 182 14.1 0.0 14.1
Liberia Jan./Dec. 31.4 168.4 199.8 240 176.0 165.0 11.0
Nigeria July/June 1,383.4 0.0 1,383.4 1,100 1,100.0 0.0 1,100.0
Sierra Leone Jan./Dec. 125.1 34.0 159.1 172 44.4 22.5 21.9
Togo Jan./Dec. 86.2 7.5 93.7 128 44.2 3.1 41.1
Sahellian
countries 1,139.8 242.8 1,382.6 1,399 617.8 250.6 367.2
Burkina
Faso Nov./Oct. 122.6 35.5 158.1 110 52.0 42.5 9.5
Cape Verde Jan./Dec. 24.9 64.0 88.9 90 88.3 83.4 4.9
Chad Nov./Oct. 78.7 13.2 91.9 50 25.9 22.7 3.2
Gambia Nov./Oct. 69.0 5.5 74.5 74 19.2 4.0 15.2
Guinea Bissau Jan./Dec. 49.1 3.9 53.0 65 12.0 6.3 5.7
Mali Nov./Oct. 62.5 23.6 86.1 60 13.2 11.8 1.4
Mauritania Nov./Oct. 161.4 46.3 207.7 190 127.4 45.8 81.6
Niger Nov./Oct. 84.5 24.0 108.5 90 41.2 18.6 22.6
Senegal Nov./Oct. 487.1 26.8 513.9 670 238.6 15.5 223.1
Central Africa 650.7 112.9 763.6 543 458.3 107.5 350.8
Cameroon July/June 370.7 2.7 373.4 210 210.0 2.9 207.1
Central
African Rep. Sept./Aug 33.8 1.2 35.0 30 11.3 0.8 10.5
Congo July/June 86.7 1.7 88.4 90 90.0 33.9 56.1
Eq.Guinea Jan./Dec. 7.2 2.8 10.0 11 3.3 3.3 0.0
SaoTome Jan./Dec. 1.8 8.4 10.2 12 4.7 2.5 2.2
Zaire Jan./Dec. 150.5 96.1 246.6 190 139.0 64.1 74.9
ASIA 28,856.7 1,879.1 30,735.8 41,833 41,633.0 2,074.1 39,558.9
Afghanistan July/June 1,015.4 64.6 1,080.0 1,150 1,150.0 151.7 998.3
Bangladesh July/June 545.9 654.1 1,200.0 2,411 2,411.0 963.8 1,447.2
Bhutan July/June 29.0 1.0 30.0 32 32.2 0.2 32.0
Cambodia Jan./Dec. 150.2 29.8 180.0 200 69.9 64.0 5.9
(cont'd)G/AG/W/12
Page12
Country Marketing
year1993/94 or1994 1994/95 or1995
Actual imports Import position
Commer-
cial
purchasesFood
aidTotal
commercial
andaidTotal
import
require-
ments
(excluding
re-exports)Total
commer-
cialand
aidFood aid
allocated
committed
orshippedCommercial
purchases
China3July/June 14,144.8 119.2 14,264.0 23,000 23,003.2 224.0 22,779.2
India July/June 266.8 295.2 562.0 150 177.0 96.0 79.0
Indonesia April/Mar. 3,012.4 97.5 3,109.9 3,940 5,215.0 32.2 5,182.8
Jordan July/June 1,345.1 220.9 1,566.0 1,717 1,717.0 128.8 1,588.2
Laco Jan./Dec. 193.7 12.3 206.0 70 0.8 0.8 0.0
Maldives Jan./Dec. 49.9 1.4 51.3 36 4.4 0.0 4.4
Mongolia Oct./Sept. 0.0 25.0 25.0 140 12.7 11.7 1.0
Nepal July/June 52.5 14.5 67.0 137 137.0 14.7 122.3
Pakistan4May/April 2,215.0 0.0 2,215.0 2,500 2,500.0 21.8 2,478.2
Philippines July/June 2,278.0 45.8 2,323.8 2,500 2,526.7 108.7 2,418.0
SriLanka Jan./Dec. 853.8 209.8 1,063.6 1,200 651.5 141.1 510.4
Syria July/June 932.8 59.4 992.2 690 690.0 45.4 644.6
Yemen Jan./Dec. 1,771.4 28.6 1,800.0 1,960 1,334.6 67.2 1,267.4
CENTRAL
AMERICA 2,325.3 680.7 2,806.0 3,085 2,628.3 272.6 2,355.7
Dominican
Rep. Jan./Dec. 1,156.8 1.7 1,158.5 868 499.0 2.5 496.5
ElSalvador Aug./July 283.1 80.4 363.5 477 363.5 18.0 345.5
Guatemala July/June 211.5 299.6 511.1 588 593.8 108.0 485.8
Haiti July/June 146.0 112.2 258.2 402 412.7 39.0 373.7
Honduras July/June 223.8 124.7 348.5 513 514.0 95.4 418.6
Nicaragua July/June 104.1 62.1 166.2 237 245.3 9.7 235.6
SOUTH
AMERICA 2,960.8 253.5 3,214.3 2,587.7 1,275.8 163.0 1,112.8
Bolivia July/June 144.2 198.3 342.5 329 335.0 145.6 189.4
Colombia Jan./Dec. 2,205.4 42.6 2,248.0 1,798 758.6 0.0 758.6
Ecuador Jan./Dec. 611.2 12.6 623.8 460 182.2 17.4 164.8
Oceania 330.0 0.0 330.0 27.4 17.0 0.0 17.0
Kiribati Jan./Dec. 7.0 0.0 7.0 7 0.0 0.0 0.0
Papua New
Guinea Jan./Dec. 278.9 0.0 278.9 223 14.2 0.0 14.2
Samoa Jan./Dec. 15.0 0.0 15.0 15 0.2 0.0 2.5
Solomon Isl. Jan./Dec. 19.0 0.0 19.0 19 2.5 0.0 2.5
Tuvalu Jan./Dec. 1.0 0.0 1.0 1 0.0 0.0 0.0
(cont'd)G/AG/W/12
Page13
Country Marketing
year1993/94 or1994 1994/95 or1995
Actual imports Import position
Commer-
cial
purchasesFood
aidTotal
commercial
andaidTotal
import
require-
ments
(excluding
re-exports)Total
commer-
cialand
aidFood aid
allocated
committed
orshippedCommercial
purchases
Vanuatu Jan./Dec. 9.1 0.0 9.1 9 0.1 0.0 0.1
Europe/
CIS5/67,667.0 1,752.0 9,419.0 7,056 7,098.0 2,136.0 4,962.0
Armenia July/June 182.0 258.0 440.0 477 477.0 463.0 14.0
Albania July/June 0.0 472.0 472.0 310 310.0 34.0 276.0
Azerbaijan July/June 681.0 47.0 728.0 670 670.0 366.0 304.0
Georgia July/June 377.0 478.0 855.0 722 722.0 677.0 45.0
Kyrgyz. Rep. July/June 275.0 163.0 440.0 333 333.0 124.0 209.0
Lithuania July/June 136.0 0.0 136.0 25 25.0 0.0 25.0
Moldova July/June 188.0 110.0 298.0 435 477.0 252.0 225.0
Macedonia,
FYR July/June 160.0 50.0 210.0 240 240.0 46.0 194.0
Romania July/June 1,326.0 0.0 1,226.0 260 260.0 0.0 260.0
Tajikistan July/June 717.0 83.0 800.0 409 409.0 124.0 285.0
Turkmenistan July/June 682.0 89.0 771.0 570 570.0 50.0 520.0
Uzbekistan July/June 2,943.0 0.0 2,943.0 2,605 2,605.0 0.0 2,605.0
TOTAL 60,169.1 8,875.0 69,044.1 75,585 71,517.8 7,796.5 63,721.3
Source: FAO.
1Includes fooddeficit countries withpercapita income below thelevelusedbytheWorld Bank todetermine eligibility forIDA
assistance (i.e.US$1,345 in1993), which isinaccordance withtheguidelines andcriteria agreed tobytheCFA should begiven priority
intheallocation offoodaid.
2Includes refugee needs.
3Includes import requirements ofTaiwan Province.
4Excludes Afghan refugee requirements.
5Classified asLIFD countries asofJanuary 1995.
6Datainclude insurance between theRepublics.G/AG/W/12
Page14
Estimated Import Requirements ofCereals: Low-Income Food-Deficit Countries1(thousand tons)
(b)1995/96 Estimates forLIFD Countries Which Have
Entered the1995/96 Marketing Year
Country Marketing
year1994/95 or1995 1995/96
Actual imports Import position
Commer-
cial
purchasesFood
aidTotal
commercial
andaidTotal
import
require-
ments
(excluding
re-exports)Total
commer-
cialand
aidFood aid
allocated
committed
orshippedCommercial
purchases
AFRICA 14,729.0 1,601.3 16,330.3 17,675 667.6 515.9 151.7
Northern
Africa 19,471.8 226.4 10,698.2 11,760 84.8 84.8 0.0
Egypt July/June 8,439.4 158.8 8,593.2 7,750 84.8 84.8 0.0
Morocco July/June 2,032.4 67.6 2,100.0 4,010 0.0 0.0 0.0
Eastern
Africa 719.4 302.0 1,021.4 1,184 12.2 12.2 0.0
Kenya July/June 430.5 156.1 586.6 1,075 8.2 8.2 0.0
Tanzania June/May 288.9 145.9 434.8 109 4.0 4.0 0.0
Southern
Africa 1,736.9 973.8 2,710.7 276.1 512.7 361.0 151.7
Angola April/Mar. 263.3 296.7 560.0 560 115.7 109.1 6.6
Lesotho April/Mar. 172.0 32.0 204.0 297 1.0 1.0 0.0
Madagascar April/Mar. 177.0 23.4 200.4 146 13.5 13.5 0.0
Malawi April/Mar. 212.3 279.7 492.0 180 100.2 92.3 7.9
Mozambique May/April 275.8 324.2 600.0 446 116.9 111.6 5.3
Swaziland May/April 67.3 8.7 76.0 93 6.9 0.0 6.9
Zambia May/April 386.1 3.9 390.0 589 24.5 24.5 0.0
Zimbabwe April/Mar. 183.1 5.2 188.3 450 134.0 9.0 125.0
Western
Africa 1,537.7 62.3 1,600.0 1,600 36.1 36.1 0.0
Coastal
Countries 1,537.7 62.3 1,600.0 1,600 36.1 36.1 0.0
Côted'Ivoire July/June 437.7 62.3 500.0 500 36.1 36.1 0.0
Nigeria July/June 1,100.0 0.0 1,100.0 1,100 0.0 0.0 0.0
Central Africa 263.2 36.8 300.0 370 21.8 21.8 0.0
Cameroon July/June 207.1 2.9 210.0 280 0.0 0.0 0.0
Congo July/June 56.1 33.9 90.0 90 21.8 21.8 0.0
ASIA 37,769.8 1,789.3 39,559.1 37,349 3,129.0 620.0 2,509.0
Afghanistan July/June 998.3 151.7 1,150.0 1,250 252.1 2.1 250.0
Bangladesh July/June 1,447.2 963.8 2,411.0 2,050 0.0 0.0 0.0
(cont'd)G/AG/W/12
Page15
Country Marketing
year1994/95 or1995 1995/96
Actual imports Import position
Commer-
cial
purchasesFood
aidTotal
commercial
andaidTotal
import
require-
ments
(excluding
re-exports)Total
commer-
cialand
aidFood aid
allocated
committed
orshippedCommercial
purchases
Bhutan July/June 32.0 0.2 32.2 32 0.0 0.0 0.0
China3July/June 22,779.2 224.0 23,003.2 21,175 1,613.5 91.3 1,522.2
India July/June 79.0 98.0 177.0 150 268.9 268.9 0.0
Indonesia April/Mar. 5,182.8 32.2 5,215.0 5,735 281.1 14.5 266.6
Jordan July/June 1,588.2 128.3 1,717.0 1,610 385.2 115.0 270.2
Nepal July/June 122.3 14.7 137.0 137 7.3 7.3 0.0
Pakistan4May/April 2,478.2 21.8 2,500.0 2,200 104.2 104.2 0.0
Philippines July/June 2,418.0 108.7 2,526.7 2,400 211.2 11.2 200.0
Syria July/June 644.6 45.4 690.0 610 5.5 5.5 0.0
CENTRAL
AMERICA 1,513.7 252.1 1,765.8 1,466 378.5 378.5 0.0
Guatemala July/June 485.8 108.0 593.8 540 119.0 119.0 0.0
Haiti July/June 373.7 39.0 412.7 401 95.2 95.2 0.0
Honduras July/June 418.6 95.4 514.0 350 99.6 99.6 0.0
Nicaragua July/June 235.6 9.7 245.3 175 64.7 64.7 0.0
SOUTH
AMERICA 189.4 145.6 335.0 300 82.7 82.7 0.0
Bolivia July/June 189.4 145.6 335.6 300 82.7 82.7 0.0
EUROPE/
CIS5/64,962.0 2,136.0 7,098.0 6,615 154.0 154.0 0.0
Armenia July/June 14.0 463.0 477.0 450 0.0 0.0 0.0
Albania July/June 276.0 34.0 310.0 310 0.0 0.0 0.0
Azerbaijan July/June 304.0 366.0 670.0 663 4.0 4.0 0.0
Georgia July/June 45.0 677.0 722.0 560 2.0 2.0 0.0
Kyrgyz. Rep. July/June 209.0 124.0 333.0 352 58.0 58.0 0.0
Lithuania July/June 25.0 0.0 25.0 30 0.0 0.0 0.0
Moldova July/June 225.0 252.0 477.0 155 52.0 52.0 0.0
Macedonia,
FYRJuly/June 194.0 46.0 240.0 240 0.0 0.0 0.0
Romania July/June 260.0 0.0 260.0 260 0.0 0.0 0.0
(cont'd)G/AG/W/12
Page16
Country Marketing
year1994/95 or1995 1995/96
Actual imports Import position
Commer-
cial
purchasesFood
aidTotal
commercial
andaidTotal
import
require-
ments
(excluding
re-exports)Total
commer-
cialand
aidFood aid
allocated
committed
orshippedCommercial
purchases
Tajikistan July/June 285.0 124.0 409.0 590 38.0 38.0 0.0
Turkmenistan July/June 520.0 50.0 570.0 500 0.0 0.0 0.0
Uzbekistan July/June 2,605.0 0.0 2,605.0 2,505 0.0 0.0 0.0
TOTAL 59,163.9 5,924.3 65,088.2 63,453 4,411.8 1,751.1 2,660.7
Source: FAO.
1Includes fooddeficit countries withpercapita income below thelevelusedbytheWorld Bank todetermine eligibility forIDA
assistance (i.e.US$1,345 in1993), which isinaccordance withtheguidelines andcriteria agreed tobytheCFA should begiven priority
intheallocation offoodaid.
2Includes refugee needs.
3Includes import requirements ofTaiwan Province.
4Excludes Afghan refugee requirements.
5Classified asLIFD countries asofJanuary 1995.
6Datainclude insurance between theRepublics.