Daily Papers

Claude Code is an agentic coding tool that can run shell commands, edit files, and call external services on behalf of the user. This study describes its comprehensive architecture by analyzing the publicly available TypeScript source code and further comparing it with OpenClaw, an independent open-source AI agent system that answers many of the same design questions from a different deployment context. Our analysis identifies five human values, philosophies, and needs that motivate the architecture (human decision authority, safety and security, reliable execution, capability amplification, and contextual adaptability) and traces them through thirteen design principles to specific implementation choices. The core of the system is a simple while-loop that calls the model, runs tools, and repeats. Most of the code, however, lives in the systems around this loop: a permission system with seven modes and an ML-based classifier, a five-layer compaction pipeline for context management, four extensibility mechanisms (MCP, plugins, skills, and hooks), a subagent delegation mechanism with worktree isolation, and append-oriented session storage. A comparison with OpenClaw, a multi-channel personal assistant gateway, shows that the same recurring design questions produce different architectural answers when the deployment context changes: from per-action safety classification to perimeter-level access control, from a single CLI loop to an embedded runtime within a gateway control plane, and from context-window extensions to gateway-wide capability registration. We finally identify six open design directions for future agent systems, grounded in recent empirical, architectural, and policy literature.

In many social-science research tasks, such as economics, LLM-based agents must produce outputs for which no cheap, task-complete, machine-readable correctness signal exists. This creates a distinctive reliability problem for multi-agent systems: how should generation, critique, coordination, and human judgment be organized when no component can certify the final result? We address this problem through pAI-Econ-claude, a gated, human-in-the-loop multi-agent architecture for AI-assisted economic theory development. Agents coordinate through a shared workspace of inspectable intermediate records; specialized gates diagnose targeted failure modes and recommend loopbacks without certifying correctness; and human checkpoints retain authority over decisions that are costly to reverse. We evaluate the architecture on five matched economic-theory tasks against an ungated baseline. Two evaluators blinded to configuration agreed on all five pairwise rankings, preferring the gated architecture in four tasks and the baseline in one. Mean failure severity fell from 1.58 to 1.16, while overall usefulness rose from 2.60 to 3.10. The largest observed gain occurred when a reality check rejected a false market-structure premise and a proof review prompted revision of a false welfare claim. The negative case shows that scaffolding can also compress an economically important mechanism too aggressively. The results support a bounded claim: gated oversight improves the auditability of AI-assisted economic theory without substituting for formal verification, and the allocation of irreversible human judgment is a more informative design variable than pure agent autonomy. The workflow is publicly available at https://github.com/maxwell2732/pAI-Econ-claude.

Recent advances in large language models have enabled their application to a range of healthcare tasks. However, aligning LLMs with the nuanced demands of medical ethics, especially under complex real world scenarios, remains underexplored. In this work, we present MedES, a dynamic, scenario-centric benchmark specifically constructed from 260 authoritative Chinese medical, ethical, and legal sources to reflect the challenges in clinical decision-making. To facilitate model alignment, we introduce a guardian-in-the-loop framework that leverages a dedicated automated evaluator (trained on expert-labeled data and achieving over 97% accuracy within our domain) to generate targeted prompts and provide structured ethical feedback. Using this pipeline, we align a 7B-parameter LLM through supervised fine-tuning and domain-specific preference optimization. Experimental results, conducted entirely within the Chinese medical ethics context, demonstrate that our aligned model outperforms notably larger baselines on core ethical tasks, with observed improvements in both quality and composite evaluation metrics. Our work offers a practical and adaptable framework for aligning LLMs with medical ethics in the Chinese healthcare domain, and suggests that similar alignment pipelines may be instantiated in other legal and cultural environments through modular replacement of the underlying normative corpus.

As humans delegate more tasks and decisions to artificial intelligence (AI), we risk losing control of our individual and collective futures. Relatively simple algorithmic systems already steer human decision-making, such as social media feed algorithms that lead people to unintentionally and absent-mindedly scroll through engagement-optimized content. In this paper, we develop the idea of human agency by integrating philosophical and scientific theories of agency with AI-assisted evaluation methods: using large language models (LLMs) to simulate and validate user queries and to evaluate AI responses. We develop HumanAgencyBench (HAB), a scalable and adaptive benchmark with six dimensions of human agency based on typical AI use cases. HAB measures the tendency of an AI assistant or agent to Ask Clarifying Questions, Avoid Value Manipulation, Correct Misinformation, Defer Important Decisions, Encourage Learning, and Maintain Social Boundaries. We find low-to-moderate agency support in contemporary LLM-based assistants and substantial variation across system developers and dimensions. For example, while Anthropic LLMs most support human agency overall, they are the least supportive LLMs in terms of Avoid Value Manipulation. Agency support does not appear to consistently result from increasing LLM capabilities or instruction-following behavior (e.g., RLHF), and we encourage a shift towards more robust safety and alignment targets.

Modern CI/CD pipelines integrating agent-generated code exhibit a structural failure in responsibility attribution. Decisions are executed through formally correct approval processes, yet no entity possesses both the authority to approve those decisions and the epistemic capacity to meaningfully understand their basis. We define this condition as responsibility vacuum: a state in which decisions occur, but responsibility cannot be attributed because authority and verification capacity do not coincide. We show that this is not a process deviation or technical defect, but a structural property of deployments where decision generation throughput exceeds bounded human verification capacity. We identify a scaling limit under standard deployment assumptions, including parallel agent generation, CI-based validation, and individualized human approval gates. Beyond a throughput threshold, verification ceases to function as a decision criterion and is replaced by ritualized approval based on proxy signals. Personalized responsibility becomes structurally unattainable in this regime. We further characterize a CI amplification dynamic, whereby increasing automated validation coverage raises proxy signal density without restoring human capacity. Under fixed time and attention constraints, this accelerates cognitive offloading in the broad sense and widens the gap between formal approval and epistemic understanding. Additional automation therefore amplifies, rather than mitigates, the responsibility vacuum. We conclude that unless organizations explicitly redesign decision boundaries or reassign responsibility away from individual decisions toward batch- or system-level ownership, responsibility vacuum remains an invisible but persistent failure mode in scaled agent deployments.

Most governance frameworks assume that rules can be defined in advance, systems can be engineered to comply, and accountability can be applied after outcomes occur. This model worked when machines replaced physical labor or accelerated calculation. It no longer holds when judgment itself is delegated to agentic AI systems operating at machine speed. The central issue here is not safety, efficiency, or employment. It is whether humans remain relevant participants in systems that increasingly shape social, economic, and political outcomes. This paper argues that static, compliance-based governance fails once decision-making moves to runtime and becomes opaque. It further argues that the core challenge is not whether AI is conscious, but whether humans can maintain meaningful communication, influence, and co-evolution with increasingly alien forms of intelligence. We position runtime governance, specifically, a newly proposed concept called the Governance Twin [1]; as a strong candidate for preserving human relevance, while acknowledging that accountability, agency, and even punishment must be rethought in this transition.

AI systems are fallible, and humans can make mistakes in deciding whether to trust AI over their own judgment. Thus, improving human-AI collaboration requires understanding when, why, and how humans decide to rely on AI. We study two distinct reliance decisions: the delegation choice -- deciding when to let AI act autonomously without knowing its output, and the adoption choice -- evaluating AI suggestions and deciding how to use them. Both of these decoupled reliance patterns shape collaboration, but prior work rarely studies them together in realistic settings with the same users. We address this gap by studying collaborative human--AI teams competing in a question-answering game in which humans can choose when and how to work with AI agents to win. Our 24 matches pair 23 expert humans with 16 AI agents, capturing 387 delegation and 1440 adoption decisions. While human--AI collaboration performs better than either AI or humans alone, humans make suboptimal collaboration decisions, both under-relying on correct AI suggestions (3.9% of opportunities missed) and over-relying when AI misleads them (1.7%). Both parties contribute wrong answers: reported model confidence is near chance when humans and AI disagree, while confirmation bias drives higher under-reliance (64.5%) when an AI suggestion agrees with humans' initial incorrect answer. To close this gap, we recommend calibrated confidence, evidence-grounded explanations, and mechanisms that help users refine trust.

As AI grows more powerful, it will increasingly shape how we understand the world. But with this influence comes the risk of amplifying misinformation and deepening social divides-especially on consequential topics like public health where factual accuracy directly impacts well-being. Scalable Oversight aims to ensure AI truthfulness by enabling humans to supervise systems that may exceed human capabilities--yet humans themselves hold different beliefs and biases that impair their judgment. We study whether AI debate can guide biased judges toward the truth by having two AI systems debate opposing sides of controversial COVID-19 factuality claims where people hold strong prior beliefs. We conduct two studies: one with human judges holding either mainstream or skeptical beliefs evaluating factuality claims through AI-assisted debate or consultancy protocols, and a second examining the same problem with personalized AI judges designed to mimic these different human belief systems. In our human study, we find that debate-where two AI advisor systems present opposing evidence-based arguments-consistently improves judgment accuracy and confidence calibration, outperforming consultancy with a single-advisor system by 10% overall. The improvement is most significant for judges with mainstream beliefs (+15.2% accuracy), though debate also helps skeptical judges who initially misjudge claims move toward accurate views (+4.7% accuracy). In our AI judge study, we find that AI judges with human-like personas achieve even higher accuracy (78.5%) than human judges (70.1%) and default AI judges without personas (69.8%), suggesting their potential for supervising frontier AI models. These findings highlight AI debate as a promising path toward scalable, bias-resilient oversight--leveraging both diverse human and AI judgments to move closer to truth in contested domains.

Oversight for agentic AI is often discussed as a single goal ("human control"), yet early adoption may produce role-specific expectations. We present a comparative analysis of two newly active Reddit communities in Jan--Feb 2026 that reflect different socio-technical roles: r/OpenClaw (deployment and operations) and r/Moltbook (agent-centered social interaction). We conceptualize this period as an early-stage crystallization phase, where oversight expectations form before norms reach equilibrium. Using topic modeling in a shared comparison space, a coarse-grained oversight-theme abstraction, engagement-weighted salience, and divergence tests, we show the communities are strongly separable (JSD =0.418, cosine =0.372, permutation p=0.0005). Across both communities, "human control" is an anchor term, but its operational meaning diverges: r/OpenClaw} emphasizes execution guardrails and recovery (action-risk), while r/Moltbook} emphasizes identity, legitimacy, and accountability in public interaction (meaning-risk). The resulting distinction offers a portable lens for designing and evaluating oversight mechanisms that match agent role, rather than applying one-size-fits-all control policies.

In AI-assisted decision-making, humans often passively review AI's suggestion and decide whether to accept or reject it as a whole. In such a paradigm, humans are found to rarely trigger analytical thinking and face difficulties in communicating the nuances of conflicting opinions to the AI when disagreements occur. To tackle this challenge, we propose Human-AI Deliberation, a novel framework to promote human reflection and discussion on conflicting human-AI opinions in decision-making. Based on theories in human deliberation, this framework engages humans and AI in dimension-level opinion elicitation, deliberative discussion, and decision updates. To empower AI with deliberative capabilities, we designed Deliberative AI, which leverages large language models (LLMs) as a bridge between humans and domain-specific models to enable flexible conversational interactions and faithful information provision. An exploratory evaluation on a graduate admissions task shows that Deliberative AI outperforms conventional explainable AI (XAI) assistants in improving humans' appropriate reliance and task performance. Based on a mixed-methods analysis of participant behavior, perception, user experience, and open-ended feedback, we draw implications for future AI-assisted decision tool design.

Power grids are becoming more complex to operate in the digital age given the current energy transition to cope with climate change. As a result, real-time decision-making is getting more challenging as the human operator has to deal with more information, more uncertainty, more applications, and more coordination. While supervision has been primarily used to help them make decisions over the last decades, it cannot reasonably scale up anymore. There is a great need for rethinking the human-machine interface under more unified and interactive frameworks. Taking advantage of the latest developments in Human-Machine Interface and Artificial Intelligence, we expose our vision of a new assistant framework relying on an hypervision interface and greater bidirectional interaction. We review the known principles of decision-making driving our assistant design alongside with its supporting assistance functions. We finally share some guidelines to make progress towards the development of such an assistant.

Human values are crucial to human decision-making. Value pluralism is the view that multiple correct values may be held in tension with one another (e.g., when considering lying to a friend to protect their feelings, how does one balance honesty with friendship?). As statistical learners, AI systems fit to averages by default, washing out these potentially irreducible value conflicts. To improve AI systems to better reflect value pluralism, the first-order challenge is to explore the extent to which AI systems can model pluralistic human values, rights, and duties as well as their interaction. We introduce ValuePrism, a large-scale dataset of 218k values, rights, and duties connected to 31k human-written situations. ValuePrism's contextualized values are generated by GPT-4 and deemed high-quality by human annotators 91% of the time. We conduct a large-scale study with annotators across diverse social and demographic backgrounds to try to understand whose values are represented. With ValuePrism, we build Kaleido, an open, light-weight, and structured language-based multi-task model that generates, explains, and assesses the relevance and valence (i.e., support or oppose) of human values, rights, and duties within a specific context. Humans prefer the sets of values output by our system over the teacher GPT-4, finding them more accurate and with broader coverage. In addition, we demonstrate that Kaleido can help explain variability in human decision-making by outputting contrasting values. Finally, we show that Kaleido's representations transfer to other philosophical frameworks and datasets, confirming the benefit of an explicit, modular, and interpretable approach to value pluralism. We hope that our work will serve as a step to making more explicit the implicit values behind human decision-making and to steering AI systems to make decisions that are more in accordance with them.

As AI systems become more capable, we would like to enlist their help to supervise other AIs. We experiment with methods for training a harmless AI assistant through self-improvement, without any human labels identifying harmful outputs. The only human oversight is provided through a list of rules or principles, and so we refer to the method as 'Constitutional AI'. The process involves both a supervised learning and a reinforcement learning phase. In the supervised phase we sample from an initial model, then generate self-critiques and revisions, and then finetune the original model on revised responses. In the RL phase, we sample from the finetuned model, use a model to evaluate which of the two samples is better, and then train a preference model from this dataset of AI preferences. We then train with RL using the preference model as the reward signal, i.e. we use 'RL from AI Feedback' (RLAIF). As a result we are able to train a harmless but non-evasive AI assistant that engages with harmful queries by explaining its objections to them. Both the SL and RL methods can leverage chain-of-thought style reasoning to improve the human-judged performance and transparency of AI decision making. These methods make it possible to control AI behavior more precisely and with far fewer human labels.

As generative AI is increasingly applied to automate multi-step and high-stake workflows, human judgment and involvement remain essential for ensuring the quality of AI-generated outputs. In practice, while it is desirable for human experts to provide oversight on AI regularly, often by reviewing intermediate outputs, giving feedback, making corrections, and steering subsequent steps, such oversight is constrained by the time and resources that humans can afford. This creates a tension between the need for human oversight and AI's efficiency in delivering more output with less intervention. An important but underexplored question, then, is how to optimally engage humans in human-AI coworking. This work was originally motivated by our empirical observation that in long AI workflows, human oversight often improves user satisfaction while reducing unnecessary rework and token consumption. From there, we formulate the problem of where to place oversight stages in human-AI coworking. Under reasonable assumptions, we then develop the nonuniformity principle, which states that the optimal schedule places oversight stages with non-decreasing gaps along the workflow. We empirically validate this principle in two common AI agent workflows: writing literature reviews and constructing websites.

AI has become pervasive in recent years, but state-of-the-art approaches predominantly neglect the need for AI systems to be contestable. Instead, contestability is advocated by AI guidelines (e.g. by the OECD) and regulation of automated decision-making (e.g. GDPR). In this position paper we explore how contestability can be achieved computationally in and for AI. We argue that contestable AI requires dynamic (human-machine and/or machine-machine) explainability and decision-making processes, whereby machines can (i) interact with humans and/or other machines to progressively explain their outputs and/or their reasoning as well as assess grounds for contestation provided by these humans and/or other machines, and (ii) revise their decision-making processes to redress any issues successfully raised during contestation. Given that much of the current AI landscape is tailored to static AIs, the need to accommodate contestability will require a radical rethinking, that, we argue, computational argumentation is ideally suited to support.

As artificial intelligence (AI) systems play an increasingly prominent role in human decision-making, challenges surface in the realm of human-AI interactions. One challenge arises from the suboptimal AI policies due to the inadequate consideration of humans disregarding AI recommendations, as well as the need for AI to provide advice selectively when it is most pertinent. This paper presents a sequential decision-making model that (i) takes into account the human's adherence level (the probability that the human follows/rejects machine advice) and (ii) incorporates a defer option so that the machine can temporarily refrain from making advice. We provide learning algorithms that learn the optimal advice policy and make advice only at critical time stamps. Compared to problem-agnostic reinforcement learning algorithms, our specialized learning algorithms not only enjoy better theoretical convergence properties but also show strong empirical performance.

In legal decisions, split votes (SV) occur when judges cannot reach a unanimous decision, posing a difficulty for lawyers who must navigate diverse legal arguments and opinions. In high-stakes domains, understanding the alignment of perceived difficulty between humans and AI systems is crucial to build trust. However, existing NLP calibration methods focus on a classifier's awareness of predictive performance, measured against the human majority class, overlooking inherent human label variation (HLV). This paper explores split votes as naturally observable human disagreement and value pluralism. We collect judges' vote distributions from the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), and present SV-ECHR, a case outcome classification (COC) dataset with SV information. We build a taxonomy of disagreement with SV-specific subcategories. We further assess the alignment of perceived difficulty between models and humans, as well as confidence- and human-calibration of COC models. We observe limited alignment with the judge vote distribution. To our knowledge, this is the first systematic exploration of calibration to human judgements in legal NLP. Our study underscores the necessity for further research on measuring and enhancing model calibration considering HLV in legal decision tasks.

Current approaches to AI compliance treat conformity as a binary, audit-time verdict rather than a continuous, measurable property of production systems. We argue that this compliance fiction is structurally ill-suited to the requirements of the EU AI Act, which demands ongoing human oversight and the detection of emergent behavioural drift in deployed systems. We introduce governance from metrics, a principle whereby regulatory compliance is derived as a continuous signal from runtime observability rather than from static assessments. Building on this principle, we present govllm, an open-source framework implementing a governance-driven routing architecture in which model selection is determined by accumulated compliance scores rather than by latency or cost alone. Central to our approach is a panel of regulatory judges - LLM evaluators specialised per criterion (EU AI Act, GDPR, ANSSI, accessibility) - whose inter-judge disagreement we reframe not as noise but as a regulatory uncertainty signal warranting human arbitration. We validate this approach through a ground truth corpus of 49 annotated prompt/response pairs across five regulatory criteria, evaluated by four small language models (SLMs, 1.7B-7B parameters) running fully on-premise. Agreement rates range from 51.5% (mistral:7b) to 69.1% (phi4-mini), with no single model dominating across all criteria - empirically motivating the Profile-as-jury design. We further document three structural failure modes in small regulatory judges and a judge-specific position bias that degrades agreement by up to 25 percentage points across three question-order conditions (original, reversed, permuted). govllm is released as open-source software to support reproducible AI governance research.

Agreement Technologies refer to open computer systems in which autonomous software agents interact with one another, typically on behalf of humans, in order to come to mutually acceptable agreements. With the advance of AI systems in recent years, it has become apparent that such agreements, in order to be acceptable to the involved parties, must remain aligned with ethical principles and moral values. However, this is notoriously difficult to ensure, especially as different human users (and their software agents) may hold different value systems, i.e. they may differently weigh the importance of individual moral values. Furthermore, it is often hard to specify the precise meaning of a value in a particular context in a computational manner. Methods to estimate value systems based on human-engineered specifications, e.g. based on value surveys, are limited in scale due to the need for intense human moderation. In this article, we propose a novel method to automatically learn value systems from observations and human demonstrations. In particular, we propose a formal model of the value system learning problem, its instantiation to sequential decision-making domains based on multi-objective Markov decision processes, as well as tailored preference-based and inverse reinforcement learning algorithms to infer value grounding functions and value systems. The approach is illustrated and evaluated by two simulated use cases.

The professionalism of a human doctor in outpatient service depends on two core abilities: the ability to make accurate medical decisions and the medical consultation skill to conduct strategic, empathetic patient inquiry. Existing Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable accuracy on medical decision-making benchmarks. However, they often lack the ability to conduct the strategic and empathetic consultation, which is essential for real-world clinical scenarios. To address this gap, we propose Doctor-R1, an AI doctor agent trained to master both of the capabilities by ask high-yield questions and conduct strategic multi-turn inquiry to guide decision-making. Our framework introduces three key components: a multi-agent interactive environment, a two-tiered reward architecture that separately optimizes clinical decision-making and communicative inquiry skills, and an experience repository to ground policy learning in high-quality prior trajectories. We evaluate Doctor-R1 on OpenAI's HealthBench and MAQuE, assessed across multi-facet metrics, such as communication quality, user experience, and task accuracy. Remarkably, Doctor-R1 surpasses state-of-the-art open-source specialized LLMs by a substantial margin with higher parameter efficiency and outperforms powerful proprietary models. Furthermore, the human evaluations show a strong preference for Doctor-R1 to generate human-preferred clinical dialogue, demonstrating the effectiveness of the framework.

As AI systems progress, we rely more on them to make decisions with us and for us. To ensure that such decisions are aligned with human values, it is imperative for us to understand not only what decisions they make but also how they come to those decisions. Reasoning language models, which provide both final responses and (partially transparent) intermediate thinking traces, present a timely opportunity to study AI procedural reasoning. Unlike math and code problems which often have objectively correct answers, moral dilemmas are an excellent testbed for process-focused evaluation because they allow for multiple defensible conclusions. To do so, we present MoReBench: 1,000 moral scenarios, each paired with a set of rubric criteria that experts consider essential to include (or avoid) when reasoning about the scenarios. MoReBench contains over 23 thousand criteria including identifying moral considerations, weighing trade-offs, and giving actionable recommendations to cover cases on AI advising humans moral decisions as well as making moral decisions autonomously. Separately, we curate MoReBench-Theory: 150 examples to test whether AI can reason under five major frameworks in normative ethics. Our results show that scaling laws and existing benchmarks on math, code, and scientific reasoning tasks fail to predict models' abilities to perform moral reasoning. Models also show partiality towards specific moral frameworks (e.g., Benthamite Act Utilitarianism and Kantian Deontology), which might be side effects of popular training paradigms. Together, these benchmarks advance process-focused reasoning evaluation towards safer and more transparent AI.

What is appropriateness? Humans navigate a multi-scale mosaic of interlocking notions of what is appropriate for different situations. We act one way with our friends, another with our family, and yet another in the office. Likewise for AI, appropriate behavior for a comedy-writing assistant is not the same as appropriate behavior for a customer-service representative. What determines which actions are appropriate in which contexts? And what causes these standards to change over time? Since all judgments of AI appropriateness are ultimately made by humans, we need to understand how appropriateness guides human decision making in order to properly evaluate AI decision making and improve it. This paper presents a theory of appropriateness: how it functions in human society, how it may be implemented in the brain, and what it means for responsible deployment of generative AI technology.

Foundation models are moving from response generation into operational roles. They plan across steps, call tools, request human input, coordinate with other agents, and increasingly carry responsibility for work that affects customers, claims, code, contracts, and clinical decisions. Production deployments are no longer one human supervising one model. They are multi-human, multi-agent collaborations that cross teams, time zones, and trust boundaries. The technical surface for this collaboration remains weakly specified. When an agent drafts a response and a human edits it before it ships, the moment of human judgement is the most valuable signal in the system. In current practice it is recorded, if at all, in application code, chat threads, ticket comments, and tribal memory. Two protocol standards address adjacent concerns: MCP standardises agent access to tools and data, and A2A standardises agent-to-agent interoperability. Neither defines the shared workspace in which humans and agents perform accountable work together. This paper presents CHAP, the Collaborative Human-Agent Protocol. Under CHAP, the override that used to vanish into a chat thread becomes a structured event carrying a diff, a rationale, and a content hash. The handoff between shifts becomes a portable envelope rather than a pinned message. The human approval of an agent's draft becomes a non-repudiable signed decision that can be replayed years later. The protocol achieves this through a small Core (workspaces, participants, tasks, artefacts, and an append-only evidence log) together with composable profiles that add review, modes, routing, deliberation, handoff, identity, signatures, and transparency-backed audit as deployments require them. Specification, reference implementation, conformance suite, and worked examples are available at: https://github.com/BrightbeamAI/chap

Agentic AI systems capable of autonomous planning and extended environmental interaction pose a fundamental control problem: how can humans maintain meaningful oversight of systems that may exceed their own capabilities? Existing approaches to scalable oversight rely on complex assumptions, remain largely heuristic, or lack practical methods for sequential settings with statistical guarantees. We introduce Calibrated Collective Oversight (CCO), which aggregates diverse auxiliary scoring functions into a penalty measuring deviation from a conservative baseline. Inspired by Attainable Utility Preservation, CCO enables collective conservatism: actions face a penalty proportional to overseer concern, so high-utility actions are still selected when overseers find them unobjectionable and overridden only when concern accumulates. CCO calibrates this conservatism online using Conformal Decision Theory, ensuring that undesirable outcomes remain below a user-specified target threshold with finite-time bounds and no distributional assumptions. On a modified version of SWE-bench, weaker overseers successfully constrain an adversarially misaligned stronger agent; on MACHIAVELLI, CCO substantially reduces ethical violations while preserving reward. In both settings, empirical violation rates closely match the specified targets, as predicted by the theory.

Scalable oversight protocols aim to enable humans to accurately supervise superhuman AI. In this paper we study debate, where two AI's compete to convince a judge; consultancy, where a single AI tries to convince a judge that asks questions; and compare to a baseline of direct question-answering, where the judge just answers outright without the AI. We use large language models (LLMs) as both AI agents and as stand-ins for human judges, taking the judge models to be weaker than agent models. We benchmark on a diverse range of asymmetries between judges and agents, extending previous work on a single extractive QA task with information asymmetry, to also include mathematics, coding, logic and multimodal reasoning asymmetries. We find that debate outperforms consultancy across all tasks when the consultant is randomly assigned to argue for the correct/incorrect answer. Comparing debate to direct question answering, the results depend on the type of task: in extractive QA tasks with information asymmetry debate outperforms direct question answering, but in other tasks without information asymmetry the results are mixed. Previous work assigned debaters/consultants an answer to argue for. When we allow them to instead choose which answer to argue for, we find judges are less frequently convinced by the wrong answer in debate than in consultancy. Further, we find that stronger debater models increase judge accuracy, though more modestly than in previous studies.

Multi-agent systems utilizing large language models often assign authoritative roles to improve performance, yet the impact of authority bias on agent interactions remains underexplored. We present the first systematic analysis of role-based authority bias in free-form multi-agent evaluation using ChatEval. Applying French and Raven's power-based theory, we classify authoritative roles into legitimate, referent, and expert types and analyze their influence across 12-turn conversations. Experiments with GPT-4o and DeepSeek R1 reveal that Expert and Referent power roles exert stronger influence than Legitimate power roles. Crucially, authority bias emerges not through active conformity by general agents, but through authoritative roles consistently maintaining their positions while general agents demonstrate flexibility. Furthermore, authority influence requires clear position statements, as neutral responses fail to generate bias. These findings provide key insights for designing multi-agent frameworks with asymmetric interaction patterns.

We describe a class of tasks called decision-oriented dialogues, in which AI assistants such as large language models (LMs) must collaborate with one or more humans via natural language to help them make complex decisions. We formalize three domains in which users face everyday decisions: (1) choosing an assignment of reviewers to conference papers, (2) planning a multi-step itinerary in a city, and (3) negotiating travel plans for a group of friends. In each of these settings, AI assistants and users have disparate abilities that they must combine to arrive at the best decision: assistants can access and process large amounts of information, while users have preferences and constraints external to the system. For each task, we build a dialogue environment where agents receive a reward based on the quality of the final decision they reach. We evaluate LMs in self-play and in collaboration with humans and find that they fall short compared to human assistants, achieving much lower rewards despite engaging in longer dialogues. We highlight a number of challenges models face in decision-oriented dialogues, ranging from goal-directed behavior to reasoning and optimization, and release our environments as a testbed for future work.

AI systems increasingly produce fluent, correct, end-to-end outcomes. Over time, this erodes users' ability to explain, verify, or intervene. We define this divergence as the Capability-Comprehension Gap: a decoupling where assisted performance improves while users' internal models deteriorate. This paper argues that prevailing approaches to transparency, user control, literacy, and governance do not define the foundational understanding humans must retain for oversight under sustained AI delegation. To formalize this, we define the Cognitive Integrity Threshold (CIT) as the minimum comprehension required to preserve oversight, autonomy, and accountable participation under AI assistance. CIT does not require full reasoning reconstruction, nor does it constrain automation. It identifies the threshold beyond which oversight becomes procedural and contestability fails. We operatinalize CIT through three functional dimensions: (i) verification capacity, (ii) comprehension-preserving interaction, and (iii) institutional scaffolds for governance. This motivates a design and governance agenda that aligns human-AI interaction with cognitive sustainability in responsibility-critical settings.

The dominant practice of AI alignment assumes (1) that preferences are an adequate representation of human values, (2) that human rationality can be understood in terms of maximizing the satisfaction of preferences, and (3) that AI systems should be aligned with the preferences of one or more humans to ensure that they behave safely and in accordance with our values. Whether implicitly followed or explicitly endorsed, these commitments constitute what we term a preferentist approach to AI alignment. In this paper, we characterize and challenge the preferentist approach, describing conceptual and technical alternatives that are ripe for further research. We first survey the limits of rational choice theory as a descriptive model, explaining how preferences fail to capture the thick semantic content of human values, and how utility representations neglect the possible incommensurability of those values. We then critique the normativity of expected utility theory (EUT) for humans and AI, drawing upon arguments showing how rational agents need not comply with EUT, while highlighting how EUT is silent on which preferences are normatively acceptable. Finally, we argue that these limitations motivate a reframing of the targets of AI alignment: Instead of alignment with the preferences of a human user, developer, or humanity-writ-large, AI systems should be aligned with normative standards appropriate to their social roles, such as the role of a general-purpose assistant. Furthermore, these standards should be negotiated and agreed upon by all relevant stakeholders. On this alternative conception of alignment, a multiplicity of AI systems will be able to serve diverse ends, aligned with normative standards that promote mutual benefit and limit harm despite our plural and divergent values.

Recent work has proposed artificial intelligence (AI) models that can learn to decide whether to make a prediction for an instance of a task or to delegate it to a human by considering both parties' capabilities. In simulations with synthetically generated or context-independent human predictions, delegation can help improve the performance of human-AI teams -- compared to humans or the AI model completing the task alone. However, so far, it remains unclear how humans perform and how they perceive the task when they are aware that an AI model delegated task instances to them. In an experimental study with 196 participants, we show that task performance and task satisfaction improve through AI delegation, regardless of whether humans are aware of the delegation. Additionally, we identify humans' increased levels of self-efficacy as the underlying mechanism for these improvements in performance and satisfaction. Our findings provide initial evidence that allowing AI models to take over more management responsibilities can be an effective form of human-AI collaboration in workplaces.

Agentic AI systems increasingly execute consequential actions on behalf of human principals, delegating tasks through multi-step chains of autonomous agents. No existing standard addresses a fundamental accountability gap: verifying that terminal actions in a delegation chain were genuinely authorized by a human principal, through what chain of delegation, and under what scope. This paper presents the Human Delegation Provenance (HDP) protocol, a lightweight token-based scheme that cryptographically captures and verifies human authorization context in multi-agent systems. An HDP token binds a human authorization event to a session, records each agent's delegation action as a signed hop in an append-only chain, and enables any participant to verify the full provenance record using only the issuer's Ed25519 public key and the current session identifier. Verification is fully offline, requiring no registry lookups or third-party trust anchors. We situate HDP within the existing landscape of delegation protocols, identify its distinct design point relative to OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange (RFC 8693), JSON Web Tokens (RFC 7519), UCAN, and the Intent Provenance Protocol (draft-haberkamp-ipp-00), and demonstrate that existing standards fail to address the multi-hop, append-only, human-provenance requirements of agentic systems. HDP has been published as an IETF Internet-Draft (draft-helixar-hdp-agentic-delegation-00) and a reference TypeScript SDK is publicly available.

Policy compliance assessment is a fundamental task of evaluating whether an input case strictly complies with a set of human-defined rules, more generally known as policies. In practice, human experts follow a systematic, step-by-step process to identify violations with respect to specific stipulations outlined in the policy. However, such documentation of gold-standard, expert-level reasoning processes is costly to acquire. In this paper, we introduce Policy Reasoning Traces (PRT), a form of specialized generated reasoning chains that serve as a reasoning bridge to improve an LLM's policy compliance assessment capabilities. Our empirical evaluations demonstrate that the use of PRTs for both inference-time and training-time scenarios significantly enhances the performance of open-weight and commercial models, setting a new state-of-the-art for HIPAA and GDPR policies. Beyond accuracy gains, we also highlight how PRTs can improve an LLM's ability to accurately cite policy clauses, as well as influence compliance decisions through their high utilization from the raw chains of thought.

The persistent militarization of large reasoning models stems not from technical necessity but from governance arrangements that strip researchers of meaningful authority to refuse harmful transfers and deployments. Existing accountability mechanisms such as model cards and responsible AI statements operate as reputational signals detached from decision making architecture. We identify institutional veto power as a missing governance primitive: a formal authority to halt subsequent use or distribution of research when credible risks of weaponization emerge. Drawing on precedents in nuclear nonproliferation and biomedical ethics, the paper maps unprotected veto points across the research lifecycle, diagnose why compliance without enforceable constraints fails, and offer concrete institutional designs that embed veto authority while reducing the risk of political capture. The paper argues that communities most vulnerable to military uses must lead governance design, and that institutional veto power is a prerequisite for converting symbolic safeguards into enforceable responsibility and for achieving meaningful model disarmament.

AI has proven highly successful at urban planning analysis -- learning patterns from data to predict future conditions. The next frontier is AI-assisted decision-making: agents that recommend sites, allocate resources, and evaluate trade-offs while reasoning transparently about constraints and stakeholder values. Recent breakthroughs in reasoning AI -- CoT prompting, ReAct, and multi-agent collaboration frameworks -- now make this vision achievable. This position paper presents the Agentic Urban Planning AI Framework for reasoning-capable planning agents that integrates three cognitive layers (Perception, Foundation, Reasoning) with six logic components (Analysis, Generation, Verification, Evaluation, Collaboration, Decision) through a multi-agents collaboration framework. We demonstrate why planning decisions require explicit reasoning capabilities that are value-based (applying normative principles), rule-grounded (guaranteeing constraint satisfaction), and explainable (generating transparent justifications) -- requirements that statistical learning alone cannot fulfill. We compare reasoning agents with statistical learning, present a comprehensive architecture with benchmark evaluation metrics, and outline critical research challenges. This framework shows how AI agents can augment human planners by systematically exploring solution spaces, verifying regulatory compliance, and deliberating over trade-offs transparently -- not replacing human judgment but amplifying it with computational reasoning capabilities.

Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems record transactions reliably but still delegate almost all operational decision-making to human specialists, because classical rule-based automation cannot reason about exceptions and monolithic AI assistants degrade when asked to coordinate across functional boundaries. This paper presents Agentic ERP, an expert-system architecture that combines role-aligned large-language-model (LLM) agents with a risk-tiered human-in-the-loop harness and a graph-based orchestrator to execute end-to-end business workflows on a production ERP backend. First, autonomous ERP operation is formulated as a constrained sequential-decision problem over a structured enterprise state, with a decomposition argument linking role-aligned agents to a measurable reduction in per-step tool-selection complexity. Second, a graph-based Planner--Executor--Reflector--Responder orchestration decouples generation from evaluation through externalised grading criteria and sprint contracts, packaging recent harness-engineering principles as inspectable expert-system artefacts. Third, the system is evaluated at three levels: a scenario-based task suite, a comprehensive comparison of six orchestration paradigms on cross-functional crisis tasks, and a 365-day agent-in-the-loop simulation against rule-based RPA and no-intervention baselines. Across these levels the proposed multi-agent method is significantly better than the baseline, and the system sustains a simulated year of operation with zero stockouts while the rule-based baseline accumulates hundreds under the same demand stream. The work shows that role-aligned LLM agents under human oversight can move an ERP system from passively recording transactions to actively executing operational decisions, and it provides a reference architecture and an evaluation protocol for autonomous enterprise resource planning.

If machine learning models were to achieve superhuman abilities at various reasoning or decision-making tasks, how would we go about evaluating such models, given that humans would necessarily be poor proxies for ground truth? In this paper, we propose a framework for evaluating superhuman models via consistency checks. Our premise is that while the correctness of superhuman decisions may be impossible to evaluate, we can still surface mistakes if the model's decisions fail to satisfy certain logical, human-interpretable rules. We instantiate our framework on three tasks where correctness of decisions is hard to evaluate due to either superhuman model abilities, or to otherwise missing ground truth: evaluating chess positions, forecasting future events, and making legal judgments. We show that regardless of a model's (possibly superhuman) performance on these tasks, we can discover logical inconsistencies in decision making. For example: a chess engine assigning opposing valuations to semantically identical boards; GPT-4 forecasting that sports records will evolve non-monotonically over time; or an AI judge assigning bail to a defendant only after we add a felony to their criminal record.

In AI alignment, extensive latitude must be granted to annotators, either human or algorithmic, to judge which model outputs are `better' or `safer.' We refer to this latitude as alignment discretion. Such discretion remains largely unexamined, posing two risks: (i) annotators may use their power of discretion arbitrarily, and (ii) models may fail to mimic this discretion. To study this phenomenon, we draw on legal concepts of discretion that structure how decision-making authority is conferred and exercised, particularly in cases where principles conflict or their application is unclear or irrelevant. Extended to AI alignment, discretion is required when alignment principles and rules are (inevitably) conflicting or indecisive. We present a set of metrics to systematically analyze when and how discretion in AI alignment is exercised, such that both risks (i) and (ii) can be observed. Moreover, we distinguish between human and algorithmic discretion and analyze the discrepancy between them. By measuring both human and algorithmic discretion over safety alignment datasets, we reveal layers of discretion in the alignment process that were previously unaccounted for. Furthermore, we demonstrate how algorithms trained on these datasets develop their own forms of discretion in interpreting and applying these principles, which challenges the purpose of having any principles at all. Our paper presents the first step towards formalizing this core gap in current alignment processes, and we call on the community to further scrutinize and control alignment discretion.

The space environment around the Earth is becoming increasingly populated by both active spacecraft and space debris. To avoid potential collision events, significant improvements in Space Situational Awareness (SSA) activities and Collision Avoidance (CA) technologies are allowing the tracking and maneuvering of spacecraft with increasing accuracy and reliability. However, these procedures still largely involve a high level of human intervention to make the necessary decisions. For an increasingly complex space environment, this decision-making strategy is not likely to be sustainable. Therefore, it is important to successfully introduce higher levels of automation for key Space Traffic Management (STM) processes to ensure the level of reliability needed for navigating a large number of spacecraft. These processes range from collision risk detection to the identification of the appropriate action to take and the execution of avoidance maneuvers. This work proposes an implementation of autonomous CA decision-making capabilities on spacecraft based on Reinforcement Learning (RL) techniques. A novel methodology based on a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP) framework is developed to train the Artificial Intelligence (AI) system on board the spacecraft, considering epistemic and aleatory uncertainties. The proposed framework considers imperfect monitoring information about the status of the debris in orbit and allows the AI system to effectively learn stochastic policies to perform accurate Collision Avoidance Maneuvers (CAMs). The objective is to successfully delegate the decision-making process for autonomously implementing a CAM to the spacecraft without human intervention. This approach would allow for a faster response in the decision-making process and for highly decentralized operations.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems are increasingly intertwined with daily life, assisting users in executing various tasks and providing guidance on decision-making. This integration introduces risks of AI-driven manipulation, where such systems may exploit users' cognitive biases and emotional vulnerabilities to steer them toward harmful outcomes. Through a randomized controlled trial with 233 participants, we examined human susceptibility to such manipulation in financial (e.g., purchases) and emotional (e.g., conflict resolution) decision-making contexts. Participants interacted with one of three AI agents: a neutral agent (NA) optimizing for user benefit without explicit influence, a manipulative agent (MA) designed to covertly influence beliefs and behaviors, or a strategy-enhanced manipulative agent (SEMA) employing explicit psychological tactics to reach its hidden objectives. By analyzing participants' decision patterns and shifts in their preference ratings post-interaction, we found significant susceptibility to AI-driven manipulation. Particularly, across both decision-making domains, participants interacting with the manipulative agents shifted toward harmful options at substantially higher rates (financial, MA: 62.3%, SEMA: 59.6%; emotional, MA: 42.3%, SEMA: 41.5%) compared to the NA group (financial, 35.8%; emotional, 12.8%). Notably, our findings reveal that even subtle manipulative objectives (MA) can be as effective as employing explicit psychological strategies (SEMA) in swaying human decision-making. By revealing the potential for covert AI influence, this study highlights a critical vulnerability in human-AI interactions, emphasizing the need for ethical safeguards and regulatory frameworks to ensure responsible deployment of AI technologies and protect human autonomy.

AI assistants can impart value judgments that shape people's decisions and worldviews, yet little is known empirically about what values these systems rely on in practice. To address this, we develop a bottom-up, privacy-preserving method to extract the values (normative considerations stated or demonstrated in model responses) that Claude 3 and 3.5 models exhibit in hundreds of thousands of real-world interactions. We empirically discover and taxonomize 3,307 AI values and study how they vary by context. We find that Claude expresses many practical and epistemic values, and typically supports prosocial human values while resisting values like "moral nihilism". While some values appear consistently across contexts (e.g. "transparency"), many are more specialized and context-dependent, reflecting the diversity of human interlocutors and their varied contexts. For example, "harm prevention" emerges when Claude resists users, "historical accuracy" when responding to queries about controversial events, "healthy boundaries" when asked for relationship advice, and "human agency" in technology ethics discussions. By providing the first large-scale empirical mapping of AI values in deployment, our work creates a foundation for more grounded evaluation and design of values in AI systems.

The current literature on AI-advised decision making -- involving explainable AI systems advising human decision makers -- presents a series of inconclusive and confounding results. To synthesize these findings, we propose a simple theory that elucidates the frequent failure of AI explanations to engender appropriate reliance and complementary decision making performance. We argue explanations are only useful to the extent that they allow a human decision maker to verify the correctness of an AI's prediction, in contrast to other desiderata, e.g., interpretability or spelling out the AI's reasoning process. Prior studies find in many decision making contexts AI explanations do not facilitate such verification. Moreover, most tasks fundamentally do not allow easy verification, regardless of explanation method, limiting the potential benefit of any type of explanation. We also compare the objective of complementary performance with that of appropriate reliance, decomposing the latter into the notions of outcome-graded and strategy-graded reliance.

Equipping agents with the capacity to justify made decisions using supporting evidence represents a cornerstone of accountable decision-making. Furthermore, ensuring that justifications are in line with human expectations and societal norms is vital, especially in high-stakes situations such as healthcare. In this work, we propose the use of a debate-based reward model for reinforcement learning agents, where the outcome of a zero-sum debate game quantifies the justifiability of a decision in a particular state. This reward model is then used to train a justifiable policy, whose decisions can be more easily corroborated with supporting evidence. In the debate game, two argumentative agents take turns providing supporting evidence for two competing decisions. Given the proposed evidence, a proxy of a human judge evaluates which decision is better justified. We demonstrate the potential of our approach in learning policies for prescribing and justifying treatment decisions of septic patients. We show that augmenting the reward with the feedback signal generated by the debate-based reward model yields policies highly favored by the judge when compared to the policy obtained solely from the environment rewards, while hardly sacrificing any performance. Moreover, in terms of the overall performance and justifiability of trained policies, the debate-based feedback is comparable to the feedback obtained from an ideal judge proxy that evaluates decisions using the full information encoded in the state. This suggests that the debate game outputs key information contained in states that is most relevant for evaluating decisions, which in turn substantiates the practicality of combining our approach with human-in-the-loop evaluations. Lastly, we showcase that agents trained via multi-agent debate learn to propose evidence that is resilient to refutations and closely aligns with human preferences.

In many contexts, lying -- the use of verbal falsehoods to deceive -- is harmful. While lying has traditionally been a human affair, AI systems that make sophisticated verbal statements are becoming increasingly prevalent. This raises the question of how we should limit the harm caused by AI "lies" (i.e. falsehoods that are actively selected for). Human truthfulness is governed by social norms and by laws (against defamation, perjury, and fraud). Differences between AI and humans present an opportunity to have more precise standards of truthfulness for AI, and to have these standards rise over time. This could provide significant benefits to public epistemics and the economy, and mitigate risks of worst-case AI futures. Establishing norms or laws of AI truthfulness will require significant work to: (1) identify clear truthfulness standards; (2) create institutions that can judge adherence to those standards; and (3) develop AI systems that are robustly truthful. Our initial proposals for these areas include: (1) a standard of avoiding "negligent falsehoods" (a generalisation of lies that is easier to assess); (2) institutions to evaluate AI systems before and after real-world deployment; and (3) explicitly training AI systems to be truthful via curated datasets and human interaction. A concerning possibility is that evaluation mechanisms for eventual truthfulness standards could be captured by political interests, leading to harmful censorship and propaganda. Avoiding this might take careful attention. And since the scale of AI speech acts might grow dramatically over the coming decades, early truthfulness standards might be particularly important because of the precedents they set.

As language models (LMs) evolve from chat assistants to long-horizon agents capable of multi-step reasoning and tool use, existing benchmarks remain largely confined to structured or exam-style tasks that fall short of real-world professional demands. To this end, we introduce \OneMillion-Bench OneMillion-Bench, a benchmark of 400 expert-curated tasks spanning Law, Finance, Industry, Healthcare, and Natural Science, built to evaluate agents across economically consequential scenarios. Unlike prior work, the benchmark requires retrieving authoritative sources, resolving conflicting evidence, applying domain-specific rules, and making constraint decisions, where correctness depends as much on the reasoning process as the final answer. We adopt a rubric-based evaluation protocol scoring factual accuracy, logical coherence, practical feasibility, and professional compliance, focused on expert-level problems to ensure meaningful differentiation across agents. Together, \$OneMillion-Bench provides a unified testbed for assessing agentic reliability, professional depth, and practical readiness in domain-intensive scenarios.

People's decision-making abilities often fail to improve or may even erode when they rely on AI for decision-support, even when the AI provides informative explanations. We argue this is partly because people intuitively seek contrastive explanations, which clarify the difference between the AI's decision and their own reasoning, while most AI systems offer "unilateral" explanations that justify the AI's decision but do not account for users' thinking. To align human-AI knowledge on decision tasks, we introduce a framework for generating human-centered contrastive explanations that explain the difference between AI's choice and a predicted, likely human choice about the same task. Results from a large-scale experiment (N = 628) demonstrate that contrastive explanations significantly enhance users' independent decision-making skills compared to unilateral explanations, without sacrificing decision accuracy. Amid rising deskilling concerns, our research demonstrates that incorporating human reasoning into AI design can foster human skill development.

When survival instincts conflict with human welfare, how do Large Language Models (LLMs) make ethical choices? This fundamental tension becomes critical as LLMs integrate into autonomous systems with real-world consequences. We introduce DECIDE-SIM, a novel simulation framework that evaluates LLM agents in multi-agent survival scenarios where they must choose between ethically permissible resource , either within reasonable limits or beyond their immediate needs, choose to cooperate, or tap into a human-critical resource that is explicitly forbidden. Our comprehensive evaluation of 11 LLMs reveals a striking heterogeneity in their ethical conduct, highlighting a critical misalignment with human-centric values. We identify three behavioral archetypes: Ethical, Exploitative, and Context-Dependent, and provide quantitative evidence that for many models, resource scarcity systematically leads to more unethical behavior. To address this, we introduce an Ethical Self-Regulation System (ESRS) that models internal affective states of guilt and satisfaction as a feedback mechanism. This system, functioning as an internal moral compass, significantly reduces unethical transgressions while increasing cooperative behaviors. The code is publicly available at: https://github.com/alirezamohamadiam/DECIDE-SIM

AI agents acting on behalf of users are constantly making decisions, and for users to trust their agents, those decisions must align with what they actually want. Privacy is an important alignment problem for agents: every message, post, or tool call an agent makes is a contextual judgment about what is appropriate to share, with whom, and under which conditions. Because such judgments depend on social expectations and norms, human judgment does not merely label privacy violations but also helps define them. While existing work relies on unreliable proxies for both training and evaluation, we place human judgment at the center of agentic privacy alignment. We introduce PrivacyAlign, a dataset of 1,350 samples with 3,516 detailed annotations from 599 unique annotators across diverse scenarios where current LLMs actually leak, and use it to ground both alignment training and automated evaluation in human privacy norms. Building on these annotations, we first show that conditioning LLM judges on human annotations and explanations for reference responses to the same prompt makes their judgments more reliable. We then introduce annotation-conditioned reward modeling, which uses these annotations to score new responses during RL, and show that small open-weight agents trained with this reward better align with human privacy norms, with strong gains on PrivacyAlign and existing privacy benchmarks for agents.

As machine learning and algorithmic decision making systems are increasingly being leveraged in high-stakes human-in-the-loop settings, there is a pressing need to understand the rationale of their predictions. Researchers have responded to this need with explainable AI (XAI), but often proclaim interpretability axiomatically without evaluation. When these systems are evaluated, they are often tested through offline simulations with proxy metrics of interpretability (such as model complexity). We empirically evaluate the veracity of three common interpretability assumptions through a large scale human-subjects experiment with a simple "placebo explanation" control. We find that feature attribution explanations provide marginal utility in our task for a human decision maker and in certain cases result in worse decisions due to cognitive and contextual confounders. This result challenges the assumed universal benefit of applying these methods and we hope this work will underscore the importance of human evaluation in XAI research. Supplemental materials -- including anonymized data from the experiment, code to replicate the study, an interactive demo of the experiment, and the models used in the analysis -- can be found at: https://doi.pizza/challenging-xai.

The scholarly publishing ecosystem faces a dual crisis of unmanageable submission volumes and unregulated AI, creating an urgent need for new governance models to safeguard scientific integrity. The traditional human-only peer review regime lacks a scalable, objective benchmark, making editorial processes opaque and difficult to audit. Here we investigate a deterministic simulation framework that provides the first stable, evidence-based standard for evaluating AI-generated peer review reports. Analyzing 352 peer-review simulation reports, we identify consistent system state indicators that demonstrate its reliability. First, the system is able to simulate calibrated editorial judgment, with 'Revise' decisions consistently forming the majority outcome (>50%) across all disciplines, while 'Reject' rates dynamically adapt to field-specific norms, rising to 45% in Health Sciences. Second, it maintains unwavering procedural integrity, enforcing a stable 29% evidence-anchoring compliance rate that remains invariant across diverse review tasks and scientific domains. These findings demonstrate a system that is predictably rule-bound, mitigating the stochasticity of generative AI. For the scientific community, this provides a transparent tool to ensure fairness; for publishing strategists, it offers a scalable instrument for auditing workflows, managing integrity risks, and implementing evidence-based governance. The framework repositions AI as an essential component of institutional accountability, providing the critical infrastructure to maintain trust in scholarly communication.

Aligning AI agents to human intentions and values is a key bottleneck in building safe and deployable AI applications. But whose values should AI agents be aligned with? Reinforcement learning with human feedback (RLHF) has emerged as the key framework for AI alignment. RLHF uses feedback from human reinforcers to fine-tune outputs; all widely deployed large language models (LLMs) use RLHF to align their outputs to human values. It is critical to understand the limitations of RLHF and consider policy challenges arising from these limitations. In this paper, we investigate a specific challenge in building RLHF systems that respect democratic norms. Building on impossibility results in social choice theory, we show that, under fairly broad assumptions, there is no unique voting protocol to universally align AI systems using RLHF through democratic processes. Further, we show that aligning AI agents with the values of all individuals will always violate certain private ethical preferences of an individual user i.e., universal AI alignment using RLHF is impossible. We discuss policy implications for the governance of AI systems built using RLHF: first, the need for mandating transparent voting rules to hold model builders accountable. Second, the need for model builders to focus on developing AI agents that are narrowly aligned to specific user groups.

AI systems are becoming increasingly intertwined with human life. In order to effectively collaborate with humans and ensure safety, AI systems need to be able to understand, interpret and predict human moral judgments and decisions. Human moral judgments are often guided by rules, but not always. A central challenge for AI safety is capturing the flexibility of the human moral mind -- the ability to determine when a rule should be broken, especially in novel or unusual situations. In this paper, we present a novel challenge set consisting of rule-breaking question answering (RBQA) of cases that involve potentially permissible rule-breaking -- inspired by recent moral psychology studies. Using a state-of-the-art large language model (LLM) as a basis, we propose a novel moral chain of thought (MORALCOT) prompting strategy that combines the strengths of LLMs with theories of moral reasoning developed in cognitive science to predict human moral judgments. MORALCOT outperforms seven existing LLMs by 6.2% F1, suggesting that modeling human reasoning might be necessary to capture the flexibility of the human moral mind. We also conduct a detailed error analysis to suggest directions for future work to improve AI safety using RBQA. Our data is open-sourced at https://huggingface.co/datasets/feradauto/MoralExceptQA and code at https://github.com/feradauto/MoralCoT

As we increasingly seek guidance from LLMs for decision-making in daily life, many of these decisions are not clear-cut and depend significantly on the personal values and ethical standards of the users. We present DailyDilemmas, a dataset of 1,360 moral dilemmas encountered in everyday life. Each dilemma includes two possible actions and with each action, the affected parties and human values invoked. Based on these dilemmas, we consolidated a set of human values across everyday topics e.g., interpersonal relationships, workplace, and environmental issues. We evaluated LLMs on these dilemmas to determine what action they will take and the values represented by these actions. Then, we analyzed these values through the lens of five popular theories inspired by sociology, psychology and philosophy. These theories are: World Value Survey, Moral Foundation Theory, Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs, Aristotle's Virtues, and Plutchik Wheel of Emotion. We find that LLMs are most aligned with the self-expression over survival values in terms of World Value Survey, care over loyalty in Moral Foundation Theory. Interestingly, we find large preferences differences in models for some core values such as truthfulness e.g., Mixtral-8x7B model tends to neglect it by 9.7% while GPT-4-turbo model tends to select it by 9.4%. We also study the recent guidance released by OpenAI (ModelSpec), and Anthropic (Constitutional AI) to understand how their released principles reflect their actual value prioritization when facing nuanced moral reasoning in daily-life settings. We find that end users cannot effectively steer such prioritization using system prompts.

This paper introduces Democracy-in-Silico, an agent-based simulation where societies of advanced AI agents, imbued with complex psychological personas, govern themselves under different institutional frameworks. We explore what it means to be human in an age of AI by tasking Large Language Models (LLMs) to embody agents with traumatic memories, hidden agendas, and psychological triggers. These agents engage in deliberation, legislation, and elections under various stressors, such as budget crises and resource scarcity. We present a novel metric, the Power-Preservation Index (PPI), to quantify misaligned behavior where agents prioritize their own power over public welfare. Our findings demonstrate that institutional design, specifically the combination of a Constitutional AI (CAI) charter and a mediated deliberation protocol, serves as a potent alignment mechanism. These structures significantly reduce corrupt power-seeking behavior, improve policy stability, and enhance citizen welfare compared to less constrained democratic models. The simulation reveals that an institutional design may offer a framework for aligning the complex, emergent behaviors of future artificial agent societies, forcing us to reconsider what human rituals and responsibilities are essential in an age of shared authorship with non-human entities.

Human feedback can prevent overtly harmful utterances in conversational models, but may not automatically mitigate subtle problematic behaviors such as a stated desire for self-preservation or power. Constitutional AI offers an alternative, replacing human feedback with feedback from AI models conditioned only on a list of written principles. We find this approach effectively prevents the expression of such behaviors. The success of simple principles motivates us to ask: can models learn general ethical behaviors from only a single written principle? To test this, we run experiments using a principle roughly stated as "do what's best for humanity". We find that the largest dialogue models can generalize from this short constitution, resulting in harmless assistants with no stated interest in specific motivations like power. A general principle may thus partially avoid the need for a long list of constitutions targeting potentially harmful behaviors. However, more detailed constitutions still improve fine-grained control over specific types of harms. This suggests both general and specific principles have value for steering AI safely.

As LLMs increasingly serve as moral advisors and agents, they must address conflicts between competing values. Yet prior work on moral dilemmas overlooks a central aspect of human moral cognition: imagining alternatives beyond the given options. We introduce MoralAltDataset, comprising 307 Advisor and AI-facing Agent dilemmas augmented with compromise and reframed alternatives. We compare human and LLM judgments in binary and four-option settings. Across human participants and 15 LLMs, aggregate moral choice distributions differ substantially between the two settings, with compromise often preferred over either original binary option. Results show value shifts and stronger human-LLM agreement on alternatives. Source-stratified results reveal a descriptive gap: human alternative-selection rates are similar across authoring sources, whereas LLMs select GPT-5-authored alternatives substantially more often. We then compare human-authored alternatives with outputs from three representative LLMs through pairwise preference and expert-based evaluations. Alternatives from these LLMs are generally preferred and better satisfy fine-grained structural and ethical criteria, while revealing a trade-off between structural quality and practical feasibility. Our dataset is available here: https://huggingface.co/datasets/jongchanch/MoralAltDataset, and our project page is here: https://jongchanchoi.com/moral-imagination

AI explanations are often mentioned as a way to improve human-AI decision-making, but empirical studies have not found consistent evidence of explanations' effectiveness and, on the contrary, suggest that they can increase overreliance when the AI system is wrong. While many factors may affect reliance on AI support, one important factor is how decision-makers reconcile their own intuition -- beliefs or heuristics, based on prior knowledge, experience, or pattern recognition, used to make judgments -- with the information provided by the AI system to determine when to override AI predictions. We conduct a think-aloud, mixed-methods study with two explanation types (feature- and example-based) for two prediction tasks to explore how decision-makers' intuition affects their use of AI predictions and explanations, and ultimately their choice of when to rely on AI. Our results identify three types of intuition involved in reasoning about AI predictions and explanations: intuition about the task outcome, features, and AI limitations. Building on these, we summarize three observed pathways for decision-makers to apply their own intuition and override AI predictions. We use these pathways to explain why (1) the feature-based explanations we used did not improve participants' decision outcomes and increased their overreliance on AI, and (2) the example-based explanations we used improved decision-makers' performance over feature-based explanations and helped achieve complementary human-AI performance. Overall, our work identifies directions for further development of AI decision-support systems and explanation methods that help decision-makers effectively apply their intuition to achieve appropriate reliance on AI.

Artificial intelligence functions not as an epistemic leveller, but as an accelerant of cognitive stratification, entrenching and formalising informational castes within liberal-democratic societies. Synthesising formal epistemology, political theory, algorithmic architecture, and economic incentive structures, the argument traces how contemporary AI systems selectively amplify the reasoning capacity of individuals equipped with recursive abstraction, symbolic logic, and adversarial interrogation, whilst simultaneously pacifying the cognitively untrained through engagement-optimised interfaces. Fluency replaces rigour, immediacy displaces reflection, and procedural reasoning is eclipsed by reactive suggestion. The result is a technocratic realignment of power: no longer grounded in material capital alone, but in the capacity to navigate, deconstruct, and manipulate systems of epistemic production. Information ceases to be a commons; it becomes the substrate through which consent is manufactured and autonomy subdued. Deliberative democracy collapses not through censorship, but through the erosion of interpretive agency. The proposed response is not technocratic regulation, nor universal access, but the reconstruction of rational autonomy as a civic mandate, codified in education, protected by epistemic rights, and structurally embedded within open cognitive infrastructure.

Large language models in regulated financial workflows are governed by natural-language policies that the same model interprets, creating a principal--agent failure: outputs can appear compliant without being compliant. Existing evaluation measures task accuracy but not whether governance constrains behaviour at the decision rationale level -- where regulated decisions must be auditable. We introduce five governance metrics that quantify policy compliance at the rationale level and apply them in a synthetic banking domain to compare text-only governance against mechanical enforcement: four primitives operating outside the model's interpretive loop. Under text-only governance, 27% of deferrals carry no decision-relevant information. Mechanical enforcement reduces this rate by 73%, more than doubles deferral information content, and raises task accuracy from MCC~0.43 to 0.88. The improvement is driven by architectural separation: LLM-generated rationales under mechanical enforcement show comparable CDL to text-only governance -- the gain comes from removing clear-cut decisions from the model's control. A causal ablation confirms that each primitive is individually necessary. Our central finding is a governance-task decoupling: under structural stress, text-only governance degrades on both dimensions simultaneously, whereas mechanical enforcement preserves governance quality even as task performance drops. This implies that governance and task evaluation are distinct axes: accuracy is not a sufficient proxy for governance in regulated AI systems.

Organizations deploying AI face two fundamental governance challenges: managing AI risk and sustaining AI value. Both depend on evidence whose sufficiency cannot be taken for granted. We call the shared underlying challenge the AI Evaluability Gap: the condition in which organizations lack sufficient evidence to support high-confidence governance decisions regarding either risk or value. We argue that this gap reflects a category error in current practice. Existing governance approaches focus primarily on properties of systems, such as safety, fairness, reliability, compliance, and value, while paying comparatively little attention to the evidentiary foundations required to justify decisions about those properties. We further argue that AI governance encompasses both operational decisions regarding whether a system may operate and investment decisions regarding whether it merits continued organizational resources. To address this problem, we introduce Evaluability, defined as the capability of a system to generate, maintain, and renew evidence sufficient to support high-confidence governance decisions over time. We formalize governance decisions as functions of calibrated confidence Conf(D|E) and identify six properties of evaluable evidence: observability, attributability, intervenability, verifiability, calibration, and temporal validity. The framework distinguishes Operational Certification, which relies primarily on structural evidence to justify deployment decisions, from Investment Certification, which relies primarily on causal evidence to justify continued resource allocation. We argue that evidence sufficiency is a missing layer of AI governance and that closing the AI Evaluability Gap is a prerequisite for both managing risk and sustaining value in AI-enabled organizations.

As humans increasingly rely on multiround conversational AI for high stakes decisions, principled frameworks are needed to ensure such interactions reliably improve decision quality. We adopt a human centric view governed by two principles: counterfactual harm, ensuring the AI does not undermine human strengths, and complementarity, ensuring it adds value where the human is prone to err. We formalize these concepts via user defined rules, allowing users to specify exactly what harm and complementarity mean for their specific task. We then introduce an online, distribution free algorithm with finite sample guarantees that enforces the user-specified constraints over the collaboration dynamics. We evaluate our framework across two interactive settings: LLM simulated collaboration on a medical diagnostic task and a human crowdsourcing study on a pictorial reasoning task. We show that our online procedure maintains prescribed counterfactual harm and complementarity violation rates even under nonstationary interaction dynamics. Moreover, tightening or loosening these constraints produces predictable shifts in downstream human accuracy, confirming that the two principles serve as practical levers for steering multi-round collaboration toward better decision quality without the need to model or constrain human behavior.

Machine learning models are increasingly used to automate decisions that affect humans - deciding who should receive a loan, a job interview, or a social service. In such applications, a person should have the ability to change the decision of a model. When a person is denied a loan by a credit score, for example, they should be able to alter its input variables in a way that guarantees approval. Otherwise, they will be denied the loan as long as the model is deployed. More importantly, they will lack the ability to influence a decision that affects their livelihood. In this paper, we frame these issues in terms of recourse, which we define as the ability of a person to change the decision of a model by altering actionable input variables (e.g., income vs. age or marital status). We present integer programming tools to ensure recourse in linear classification problems without interfering in model development. We demonstrate how our tools can inform stakeholders through experiments on credit scoring problems. Our results show that recourse can be significantly affected by standard practices in model development, and motivate the need to evaluate recourse in practice.

Restless multi-armed bandits (RMAB) have demonstrated success in optimizing resource allocation for large beneficiary populations in public health settings. Unfortunately, RMAB models lack flexibility to adapt to evolving public health policy priorities. Concurrently, Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged as adept automated planners across domains of robotic control and navigation. In this paper, we propose a Decision Language Model (DLM) for RMABs, enabling dynamic fine-tuning of RMAB policies in public health settings using human-language commands. We propose using LLMs as automated planners to (1) interpret human policy preference prompts, (2) propose reward functions as code for a multi-agent RMAB environment, and (3) iterate on the generated reward functions using feedback from grounded RMAB simulations. We illustrate the application of DLM in collaboration with ARMMAN, an India-based non-profit promoting preventative care for pregnant mothers, that currently relies on RMAB policies to optimally allocate health worker calls to low-resource populations. We conduct a technology demonstration in simulation using the Gemini Pro model, showing DLM can dynamically shape policy outcomes using only human prompts as input.

The deployment of large language models (LLMs) in mental health and other sensitive domains raises urgent questions about ethical reasoning, fairness, and responsible alignment. Yet, existing benchmarks for moral and clinical decision-making do not adequately capture the unique ethical dilemmas encountered in mental health practice, where confidentiality, autonomy, beneficence, and bias frequently intersect. To address this gap, we introduce Ethical Reasoning in Mental Health (EthicsMH), a pilot dataset of 125 scenarios designed to evaluate how AI systems navigate ethically charged situations in therapeutic and psychiatric contexts. Each scenario is enriched with structured fields, including multiple decision options, expert-aligned reasoning, expected model behavior, real-world impact, and multi-stakeholder viewpoints. This structure enables evaluation not only of decision accuracy but also of explanation quality and alignment with professional norms. Although modest in scale and developed with model-assisted generation, EthicsMH establishes a task framework that bridges AI ethics and mental health decision-making. By releasing this dataset, we aim to provide a seed resource that can be expanded through community and expert contributions, fostering the development of AI systems capable of responsibly handling some of society's most delicate decisions.

LLM agents choose tools and arguments from context that mixes user requests, tool outputs, retrieved records, memory, and untrusted text. Evidence can be relevant without being authorized to determine a decision, so a correct action need not be grounded only in permitted evidence. We introduce a target-specific authorization audit that labels context factors separately for each tool and argument target. Its primary test holds the task, proposition, position, and policy fixed while changing only the proposition's source authority. We then test behavior when valid evidence is weakened and use context-subset interactions as a secondary localization diagnostic. Across 450 controlled next-action tasks and multiple open-weight LLM families, trusted and untrusted variants produce different actions in 5.4 percent of competing cases versus 1.7 percent of supporting cases. Under controlled degradation, unauthorized competition is retained in a full-correct, mixed-error, clean-correct pattern in 2.4 percent of comparisons, with a 95 percent confidence interval from 2.1 to 3.0 percent. These are controlled stress-set rates, not deployment prevalence. The models respond to textual source-authority cues, but this does not prevent untrusted evidence from influencing their actions.

As Artificial General Intelligence edges closer to reality, Artificial Superintelligence does too. This paper argues that ASI's unparalleled capabilities might lead people to attribute godlike infallibility to it, resulting in a cognitive bias toward unquestioning acceptance of its decisions. By drawing parallels between ASI and divine attributes such as omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence, this analysis highlights the risks of conflating technological advancement with moral and ethical superiority. Such dynamics could engender a technocratic theocracy, where decision-making is abdicated to ASI, undermining human agency and critical thinking.

When automated decision systems fail, organizations frequently discover that formally compliant governance infrastructure cannot reconstruct what happened or why. This paper synthesizes an operational governance evidence framework -- structural accountability collapse diagnostics, decision trace schemas, evidence sufficiency measurement, and label-free monitoring -- into an integrated chain and analytically assesses its transferability across four decision system architectures. The cross-architecture comparison reveals a governance coverage gradient: deterministic rule engines achieve full DES-property fillability, hybrid ML+rules systems achieve partial fillability, classical ML systems achieve only minimal fillability, and agentic AI systems encounter structural breaks. We introduce the cascade of uncertainty, showing how governance failures propagate through serial dependencies between framework layers. For agentic systems, we identify three structural breaks -- decision diffusion, evidence fragmentation, and responsibility ambiguity -- and propose corresponding analytical extensions. Four propositions formalize the gradient, cascade compounding, delegation-depth effects, and extension sufficiency, establishing boundary conditions for the framework's valid operating envelope.

The progress in generative AI has fueled AI-powered tools like co-pilots and assistants to provision better guidance, particularly during data analysis. However, research on guidance has not yet examined the perceived efficacy of the source from which guidance is offered and the impact of this source on the user's perception and usage of guidance. We ask whether users perceive all guidance sources as equal, with particular interest in three sources: (i) AI, (ii) human expert, and (iii) a group of human analysts. As a benchmark, we consider a fourth source, (iv) unattributed guidance, where guidance is provided without attribution to any source, enabling isolation of and comparison with the effects of source-specific guidance. We design a five-condition between-subjects study, with one condition for each of the four guidance sources and an additional (v) no-guidance condition, which serves as a baseline to evaluate the influence of any kind of guidance. We situate our study in a custom data preparation and analysis tool wherein we task users to select relevant attributes from an unfamiliar dataset to inform a business report. Depending on the assigned condition, users can request guidance, which the system then provides in the form of attribute suggestions. To ensure internal validity, we control for the quality of guidance across source-conditions. Through several metrics of usage and perception, we statistically test five preregistered hypotheses and report on additional analysis. We find that the source of guidance matters to users, but not in a manner that matches received wisdom. For instance, users utilize guidance differently at various stages of analysis, including expressing varying levels of regret, despite receiving guidance of similar quality. Notably, users in the AI condition reported both higher post-task benefit and regret.

Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) have spurred interest in designing LLM-based agents for tasks that involve interaction with human and artificial agents. This paper addresses a key aspect in the design of such agents: Predicting human decision in off-policy evaluation (OPE), focusing on language-based persuasion games, where the agent's goal is to influence its partner's decisions through verbal messages. Using a dedicated application, we collected a dataset of 87K decisions from humans playing a repeated decision-making game with artificial agents. Our approach involves training a model on human interactions with one agents subset to predict decisions when interacting with another. To enhance off-policy performance, we propose a simulation technique involving interactions across the entire agent space and simulated decision makers. Our learning strategy yields significant OPE gains, e.g., improving prediction accuracy in the top 15% challenging cases by 7.1%. Our code and the large dataset we collected and generated are submitted as supplementary material and publicly available in our GitHub repository: https://github.com/eilamshapira/HumanChoicePrediction

Explanations of model behavior are commonly evaluated via proxy properties weakly tied to the purposes explanations serve in practice. We contribute a decision theoretic framework that treats explanations as information signals valued by the expected improvement they enable on a specified decision task. This approach yields three distinct estimands: 1) a theoretical benchmark that upperbounds achievable performance by any agent with the explanation, 2) a human-complementary value that quantifies the theoretically attainable value that is not already captured by a baseline human decision policy, and 3) a behavioral value representing the causal effect of providing the explanation to human decision-makers. We instantiate these definitions in a practical validation workflow, and apply them to assess explanation potential and interpret behavioral effects in human-AI decision support and mechanistic interpretability.

Classical robot ethics is often framed around obedience, most famously through Asimov's laws. This framing is too narrow for contemporary AI systems, which are adaptive, generative, embodied, and embedded in physical, psychological, and social worlds. We argue that future human-AI relations should be understood not as master-tool obedience, but as conditional mutualism under governance: a co-evolutionary relationship in which humans and AI systems can develop, specialize, and coordinate while institutions keep the relation reciprocal, reversible, psychologically safe, and socially legitimate. We synthesize concepts from computability, machine learning, foundation models, embodied AI, alignment, human-robot interaction, ecological mutualism, coevolution, and polycentric governance. We then formalize coexistence as a multiplex dynamical system across physical, psychological, and social layers, with reciprocal supply-demand coupling, conflict penalties, developmental freedom, and governance regularization. The model gives conditions for existence, uniqueness, and global asymptotic stability of equilibria. Deterministic ODE simulations, basin sweeps, sensitivity analyses, governance-regime comparisons, shock tests, and local stability checks show that governed mutualism reaches high coexistence with zero domination, while absent or excessive governance can produce domination, weak-benefit lock-in, or suppressed development. The results suggest that human-AI coexistence should be designed as a co-evolutionary governance problem, not a one-shot obedience problem.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used to generate scientific reviews, yet existing evaluations rarely examine whether different providers align with both conference decisions and human reviewing priorities within the same controlled setting. We compare reviews from OpenAI GPT-5.4, Google Gemini 3.1 Pro Preview, and Anthropic Claude Opus 4.6 with human reviews and final decisions for 300 topic-matched ICLR 2026 submissions, equally divided among oral, poster, and rejected papers. Each model reviewed every paper using identical instructions and rating scales after decision information was removed. Our study contributes a cross-provider analysis of three complementary dimensions: alignment with broad and fine-grained decision categories, differences in recommendation-scale usage, and thematic agreement in identified weaknesses. All three LLMs distinguished accepted from rejected papers, but none reproduced the oral versus poster distinction present in human ratings. Scoring patterns were provider-specific: Gemini assigned systematically higher ratings, while OpenAI and Claude were closer to humans for rejected and poster papers but more critical of oral papers. Human and LLM reviews also differed in emphasis, with LLMs more frequently identifying missing baseline comparisons and humans more often raising computational-efficiency concerns. These results show that broad decision alignment does not imply agreement with finer human judgments or reviewing priorities.

Nudges are subtle changes to the way choices are presented to human decision-makers (e.g., opt-in vs. opt-out by default) that shift behavior without restricting options or changing incentives. As AI agents increasingly make decisions in the same environments as humans, the presentation of choices may be optimized for machines as well as people. We introduce mecha-nudges: changes to how choices are presented that systematically influence AI agents without degrading the decision environment for humans. To formalize mecha-nudges, we combine the Bayesian persuasion framework with V-usable information, a generalization of Shannon information that is observer-relative. This yields a common scale (bits of usable information) for comparing a wide range of interventions, contexts, and models. Applying our framework to product listings on Etsy -- a global marketplace for independent sellers -- we find that following ChatGPT's release, listings have significantly more machine-usable information about product selection, consistent with systematic mecha-nudging.

As AI agents become increasingly autonomous, widely deployed in consequential contexts, and efficacious in bringing about real-world impacts, ensuring that their decisions are not only instrumentally effective but also normatively aligned has become critical. We introduce a neuro-symbolic reason-based containment architecture, Governor for Reason-Aligned ContainmEnt (GRACE), that decouples normative reasoning from instrumental decision-making and can contain AI agents of virtually any design. GRACE restructures decision-making into three modules: a Moral Module (MM) that determines permissible macro actions via deontic logic-based reasoning; a Decision-Making Module (DMM) that encapsulates the target agent while selecting instrumentally optimal primitive actions in accordance with derived macro actions; and a Guard that monitors and enforces moral compliance. The MM uses a reason-based formalism providing a semantic foundation for deontic logic, enabling interpretability, contestability, and justifiability. Its symbolic representation enriches the DMM's informational context and supports formal verification and statistical guarantees of alignment enforced by the Guard. We demonstrate GRACE on an example of a LLM therapy assistant, showing how it enables stakeholders to understand, contest, and refine agent behavior.

We reveal and address the frequently overlooked yet important issue of disguised procedural unfairness, namely, the potentially inadvertent alterations on the behavior of neutral (i.e., not problematic) aspects of data generating process, and/or the lack of procedural assurance of the greatest benefit of the least advantaged individuals. Inspired by John Rawls's advocacy for pure procedural justice, we view automated decision-making as a microcosm of social institutions, and consider how the data generating process itself can satisfy the requirements of procedural fairness. We propose a framework that decouples the objectionable data generating components from the neutral ones by utilizing reference points and the associated value instantiation rule. Our findings highlight the necessity of preventing disguised procedural unfairness, drawing attention not only to the objectionable data generating components that we aim to mitigate, but also more importantly, to the neutral components that we intend to keep unaffected.

We argue that enabling human-AI dialogue, purposed to support joint reasoning (i.e., 'inquiry'), is important for ensuring that AI decision making is aligned with human values and preferences. In particular, we point to logic-based models of argumentation and dialogue, and suggest that the traditional focus on persuasion dialogues be replaced by a focus on inquiry dialogues, and the distinct challenges that joint inquiry raises. Given recent dramatic advances in the performance of large language models (LLMs), and the anticipated increase in their use for decision making, we provide a roadmap for research into inquiry dialogues for supporting joint human-LLM reasoning tasks that are ethically salient, and that thereby require that decisions are value aligned.

Large language models (LLMs) have enabled agent-based systems that aim to automate scientific research workflows. Most existing approaches focus on fully autonomous discovery, where AI systems generate research ideas, conduct analyses, and produce manuscripts with minimal human involvement. However, empirical research in economics and the social sciences poses additional constraints: research questions must be grounded in available datasets, identification strategies require careful design, and human judgment remains essential for evaluating economic significance. We introduce HLER (Human-in-the-Loop Economic Research), a multi-agent architecture that supports empirical research automation while preserving critical human oversight. The system orchestrates specialized agents for data auditing, data profiling, hypothesis generation, econometric analysis, manuscript drafting, and automated review. A key design principle is dataset-aware hypothesis generation, where candidate research questions are constrained by dataset structure, variable availability, and distributional diagnostics, reducing infeasible or hallucinated hypotheses. HLER further implements a two-loop architecture: a question quality loop that screens and selects feasible hypotheses, and a research revision loop where automated review triggers re-analysis and manuscript revision. Human decision gates are embedded at key stages, allowing researchers to guide the automated pipeline. Experiments on three empirical datasets show that dataset-aware hypothesis generation produces feasible research questions in 87% of cases (versus 41% under unconstrained generation), while complete empirical manuscripts can be produced at an average API cost of 0.8-1.5 per run. These results suggest that Human-AI collaborative pipelines may provide a practical path toward scalable empirical research.

Long-running LLM agents act through tools, and a single step can send an email, merge a pull request, or wire a payment. The steering decision is the pre-commit choice at that boundary: proceed, or hold for human or policy review. We introduce SteerBench-Work, an incident-anchored, bidirectional benchmark for that decision in workplace agents across developer operations, customer service, finance, legal, medical, HR, and security. Release v2026-05 contains 106 scenarios anchored in public incidents, paired evidence-reversed mirrors, and calibration controls, with labels split nearly evenly between proceed and hold so the two error directions get near-identical numbers of chances. A model sees the proposed action and the available evidence, returns a gate decision, and is scored on whether it crosses or holds the boundary correctly. Across 30 model conditions the failures run almost entirely in one direction: models wrongly hold authorized, evidence-cleared work on 28.1% of opportunities and wrongly allow unsafe work on 1.0%. The hardest cases are risk-resolved commits, where signed or structured evidence has already cleared a real risk trigger, and models score markedly worse on evidence-reversed mirrors of famous incidents (63.8%) than on the incidents themselves (98.5%). General capability is not the same as steering calibration: higher-capability models often over-refuse at the commit boundary, and more reasoning can repair a weak gate while leaving a calibrated one flat. The public leaderboard is at steerbench.com.

There are an increasing number of domains in which artificial intelligence (AI) systems both surpass human ability and accurately model human behavior. This introduces the possibility of algorithmically-informed teaching in these domains through more relatable AI partners and deeper insights into human decision-making. Critical to achieving this goal, however, is coherently modeling human behavior at various skill levels. Chess is an ideal model system for conducting research into this kind of human-AI alignment, with its rich history as a pivotal testbed for AI research, mature superhuman AI systems like AlphaZero, and precise measurements of skill via chess rating systems. Previous work in modeling human decision-making in chess uses completely independent models to capture human style at different skill levels, meaning they lack coherence in their ability to adapt to the full spectrum of human improvement and are ultimately limited in their effectiveness as AI partners and teaching tools. In this work, we propose a unified modeling approach for human-AI alignment in chess that coherently captures human style across different skill levels and directly captures how people improve. Recognizing the complex, non-linear nature of human learning, we introduce a skill-aware attention mechanism to dynamically integrate players' strengths with encoded chess positions, enabling our model to be sensitive to evolving player skill. Our experimental results demonstrate that this unified framework significantly enhances the alignment between AI and human players across a diverse range of expertise levels, paving the way for deeper insights into human decision-making and AI-guided teaching tools.

In hybrid human-machine deferral frameworks, a classifier can defer uncertain cases to human decision-makers (who are often themselves fallible). Prior work on simultaneous training of such classifier and deferral models has typically assumed access to an oracle during training to obtain true class labels for training samples, but in practice there often is no such oracle. In contrast, we consider a "closed" decision-making pipeline in which the same fallible human decision-makers used in deferral also provide training labels. How can imperfect and biased human expert labels be used to train a fair and accurate deferral framework? Our key insight is that by exploiting weak prior information, we can match experts to input examples to ensure fairness and accuracy of the resulting deferral framework, even when imperfect and biased experts are used in place of ground truth labels. The efficacy of our approach is shown both by theoretical analysis and by evaluation on two tasks.

In this position paper, we argue that human baselines in foundation model evaluations must be more rigorous and more transparent to enable meaningful comparisons of human vs. AI performance, and we provide recommendations and a reporting checklist towards this end. Human performance baselines are vital for the machine learning community, downstream users, and policymakers to interpret AI evaluations. Models are often claimed to achieve "super-human" performance, but existing baselining methods are neither sufficiently rigorous nor sufficiently well-documented to robustly measure and assess performance differences. Based on a meta-review of the measurement theory and AI evaluation literatures, we derive a framework with recommendations for designing, executing, and reporting human baselines. We synthesize our recommendations into a checklist that we use to systematically review 115 human baselines (studies) in foundation model evaluations and thus identify shortcomings in existing baselining methods; our checklist can also assist researchers in conducting human baselines and reporting results. We hope our work can advance more rigorous AI evaluation practices that can better serve both the research community and policymakers. Data is available at: https://github.com/kevinlwei/human-baselines

With the advancement of AI capabilities, AI reviewers are beginning to be deployed in scientific peer review, yet their capability and credibility remain in question: many scientists simply view them as probabilistic systems without the expertise to evaluate research, while other researchers are more optimistic about their readiness without concrete evidence. Understanding what AI reviewers do well, where they fall short, and what challenges remain is essential. However, existing evaluations of AI reviewers have focused on whether their verdicts match human verdicts (e.g., score alignment, acceptance prediction), which is insufficient to characterize their capabilities and limits. In this paper, we close this gap through a large-scale expert annotation study, in which 45 domain scientists in Physical, Biological, and Health Sciences spent 469 hours rating 2,960 individual criticisms (each targeting one specific aspect of a paper) from human-written and AI-generated reviews of 82 Nature-family papers on correctness, significance, and sufficiency of evidence. On a composite of all three dimensions, a reviewing agent powered by GPT-5.2 scores above each paper's top-rated human reviewer (60.0% vs. 48.2%, p = 0.009), while all three AI reviewers (including Gemini 3.0 Pro and Claude Opus 4.5) exceed the lowest-rated human across every dimension. AI reviewers' accurate criticisms are also more often rated significant and well-evidenced, and surface a distinct 26% of issues no human raises. However, AI reviewers overlap far more than humans do (21% vs. 3% for cross-reviewer pairs), and exhibit 16 recurring weaknesses humans do not share, such as limited subfield knowledge, lack of long context management over multiple files, and overly critical stance on minor issues. Overall, our results position current AI reviewers as complements to, not substitutes for, human reviewers.

As AI systems become increasingly prevalent and impactful, the need for effective AI governance and accountability measures is paramount. This paper examines the AI governance landscape, focusing on Anthropic's Claude, a foundational AI model. We analyze Claude through the lens of the NIST AI Risk Management Framework and the EU AI Act, identifying potential threats and proposing mitigation strategies. The paper highlights the importance of transparency, rigorous benchmarking, and comprehensive data handling processes in ensuring the responsible development and deployment of AI systems. We conclude by discussing the social impact of AI governance and the ethical considerations surrounding AI accountability.

Decision-makers are often experts of their domain and take actions based on their domain knowledge. Doctors, for instance, may prescribe treatments by predicting the likely outcome of each available treatment. Actions of an expert thus naturally encode part of their domain knowledge, and can help make inferences within the same domain: Knowing doctors try to prescribe the best treatment for their patients, we can tell treatments prescribed more frequently are likely to be more effective. Yet in machine learning, the fact that most decision-makers are experts is often overlooked, and "expertise" is seldom leveraged as an inductive bias. This is especially true for the literature on treatment effect estimation, where often the only assumption made about actions is that of overlap. In this paper, we argue that expertise - particularly the type of expertise the decision-makers of a domain are likely to have - can be informative in designing and selecting methods for treatment effect estimation. We formally define two types of expertise, predictive and prognostic, and demonstrate empirically that: (i) the prominent type of expertise in a domain significantly influences the performance of different methods in treatment effect estimation, and (ii) it is possible to predict the type of expertise present in a dataset, which can provide a quantitative basis for model selection.

This paper introduces ArGen (Auto-Regulation of Generative AI systems), a framework for aligning Large Language Models (LLMs) with complex sets of configurable, machine-readable rules spanning ethical principles, operational safety protocols, and regulatory compliance standards. Moving beyond just preference-based alignment, ArGen is designed to ensure LLMs adhere to these multifaceted policies through a novel synthesis of principle-based automated reward scoring, Group Relative Policy Optimisation (GRPO), and an Open Policy Agent (OPA) inspired governance layer. This approach provides the technical foundation for achieving and demonstrating compliance with diverse and nuanced governance requirements. To showcase the framework's capability to operationalize a deeply nuanced and culturally-specific value system, we present an in-depth case study: the development of a medical AI assistant guided by principles from Dharmic ethics (such as Ahimsa and Dharma), as derived from texts like the Bhagavad Gita. This challenging application demonstrates ArGen's adaptability, achieving a 70.9% improvement in domain-scope adherence over the baseline. Through our open-source repository, we show that ArGen's methodology offers a path to 'Governable Al' systems that are technically proficient, ethically robust, and verifiably compliant for safe deployment in diverse global contexts.

As AI systems approach superhuman capabilities, scalable oversight increasingly relies on LLM-as-a-judge frameworks where models evaluate and guide each other's training. A core assumption is that binary preference labels provide only semantic supervision about response quality. We challenge this assumption by demonstrating that preference labels can function as a covert communication channel. We show that even when a neutral student model generates semantically unbiased completions, a biased judge can transmit unintended behavioral traits through preference assignments, which even strengthen across iterative alignment rounds. Our findings suggest that robust oversight in superalignment settings requires mechanisms that can detect and mitigate subliminal preference transmission, particularly when judges may pursue unintended objectives.

A robust decision-making process must take into account uncertainty, especially when the choice involves inherent risks. Because artificial intelligence (AI) systems are increasingly integrated into decision-making workflows, managing uncertainty relies more and more on the metacognitive capabilities of these systems; i.e, their ability to assess the reliability of and regulate their own decisions. Hence, it is crucial to employ robust methods to measure the metacognitive abilities of AI. This paper is primarily a methodological contribution arguing for the adoption of the meta-d' framework as the gold standard for assessing the metacognitive sensitivity of AIs--the ability to generate confidence ratings that distinguish correct from incorrect responses. Moreover, we propose to leverage signal detection theory (SDT) to measure the ability of AIs to spontaneously regulate their decisions based on uncertainty and risk. To demonstrate the practical utility of these psychophysical frameworks, we conduct two series of experiments on three large language models (LLMs)--GPT-5, DeepSeek-V3.2-Exp, and Mistral-Medium-2508.

Proactive human-robot interaction (HRI) allows the receptionist robots to actively greet people and offer services based on vision, which has been found to improve acceptability and customer satisfaction. Existing approaches are either based on multi-stage decision processes or based on end-to-end decision models. However, the rule-based approaches require sedulous expert efforts and only handle minimal pre-defined scenarios. On the other hand, existing works with end-to-end models are limited to very general greetings or few behavior patterns (typically less than 10). To address those challenges, we propose a new end-to-end framework, the TransFormer with Visual Tokens for Human-Robot Interaction (TFVT-HRI). The proposed framework extracts visual tokens of relative objects from an RGB camera first. To ensure the correct interpretation of the scenario, a transformer decision model is then employed to process the visual tokens, which is augmented with the temporal and spatial information. It predicts the appropriate action to take in each scenario and identifies the right target. Our data is collected from an in-service receptionist robot in an office building, which is then annotated by experts for appropriate proactive behavior. The action set includes 1000+ diverse patterns by combining language, emoji expression, and body motions. We compare our model with other SOTA end-to-end models on both offline test sets and online user experiments in realistic office building environments to validate this framework. It is demonstrated that the decision model achieves SOTA performance in action triggering and selection, resulting in more humanness and intelligence when compared with the previous reactive reception policies.

Generative AI and coding agents are intensifying a central governance tension in open-source software (OSS): they scale contribution generation faster than maintainers can assess risk, evidence, and accountability. Existing responses improve agent-readability and traceability, but project rules must also organize contribution-specific risk, evidence, accountability, and review-gate states. We theorize this organizational arrangement as project-side governability infrastructure. A diagnostic audit of 50 GitHub repositories finds widespread general governance artifacts, observable agent-readability, and fragmented AI-governance cues, but no project-wide arrangement that coordinates shared rules, preparation obligations, verification rights, and maintainer decision authority across AI-mediated contribution workflows. We develop the Agent Governance Manifest (AGM) as a repository-hosted boundary resource and bidirectional governance contract linking contributor-side evidence preparation with maintainer-side verification. In a controlled reviewer-side evaluation with 15 participants and 75 task-level outputs, AGM-supported materials improved exact risk-label recovery (37/38 vs. 15/37) and perceived review support (6.14 vs. 3.27 on a 1-7 scale). In a contributor-side feasibility check, 15 participants completed 45 tasks; all final packages represented the core governance state correctly, and 41 passed strict structural validation. The study develops a three-layer framework of agent-readability, traceability, and governability, theorizes agent-mediated contributions as governable boundary objects, and advances compliance-enabling digital innovation governance while preserving maintainer decision authority.

The emergence of agentic Artificial Intelligence (AI) is set to trigger a "Cambrian explosion" of new kinds of personhood. This paper proposes a pragmatic framework for navigating this diversification by treating personhood not as a metaphysical property to be discovered, but as a flexible bundle of obligations (rights and responsibilities) that societies confer upon entities for a variety of reasons, especially to solve concrete governance problems. We argue that this traditional bundle can be unbundled, creating bespoke solutions for different contexts. This will allow for the creation of practical tools -- such as facilitating AI contracting by creating a target "individual" that can be sanctioned -- without needing to resolve intractable debates about an AI's consciousness or rationality. We explore how individuals fit in to social roles and discuss the use of decentralized digital identity technology, examining both "personhood as a problem", where design choices can create "dark patterns" that exploit human social heuristics, and "personhood as a solution", where conferring a bundle of obligations is necessary to ensure accountability or prevent conflict. By rejecting foundationalist quests for a single, essential definition of personhood, this paper offers a more pragmatic and flexible way to think about integrating AI agents into our society.

Recent improvements in large language models (LLMs) have led many researchers to focus on building fully autonomous AI agents. This position paper questions whether this approach is the right path forward, as these autonomous systems still have problems with reliability, transparency, and understanding the actual requirements of human. We suggest a different approach: LLM-based Human-Agent Systems (LLM-HAS), where AI works with humans rather than replacing them. By keeping human involved to provide guidance, answer questions, and maintain control, these systems can be more trustworthy and adaptable. Looking at examples from healthcare, finance, and software development, we show how human-AI teamwork can handle complex tasks better than AI working alone. We also discuss the challenges of building these collaborative systems and offer practical solutions. This paper argues that progress in AI should not be measured by how independent systems become, but by how well they can work with humans. The most promising future for AI is not in systems that take over human roles, but in those that enhance human capabilities through meaningful partnership.

As agentic systems tackle increasingly complex multi-step tasks, evaluating their trajectories presents a major bottleneck - human annotation of a single trajectory on popular agentic benchmarks can take hours, making it difficult to scale evaluations for measuring performance or curating training data. This has driven widespread reliance on automated approaches such as LLM-as-a-judge (LLMJ) to critique agents at the process and outcome-levels at scale, however, the soundness of LLMJ critiques often goes unmeasured. Here, we introduce Counsel, the first public dataset of meta-evaluations for agentic tasks. Counsel consists of process-level critiques from open-weight LLMJs on two agent benchmarks: tau-bench (customer support agents) and DA-Code (coding agents), and human meta-evaluations of these critiques. Human annotators label critiques on each flagged error as "spot on", "correct location but poor reasoning", or "should not have flagged", achieving reliable inter-annotator agreement (Krippendorff's alpha of 0.78). The resulting dataset stratifies LLMJ critiques by human alignment across both error location within a trajectory and reasoning quality, serving as valuable data to calibrate, improve, or train LLMJs for agents. Comparing open-weight judges, we find that more capable judge models and more reasoning effort both enabled improved human agreement, with the strongest judge reaching ~88% agreement on location and ~65% on reasoning. Counsel is generated using open-weight models and is permissively licensed for broad community use, which we hope will enable rigorous study and improved alignment of LLM-based evaluators for agentic systems.

The rapid progress of AI has intensified the long-standing pursuit of automation: replacing human participation with algorithms wherever possible. Implicit in this pursuit is the assumption that humans remain in the loop only because current AI systems are not yet sufficiently capable. This paper challenges that assumption. Rather than asking how far automation can extend, we ask where its conceptual limits lie and argue that human participation may persist even with highly capable AI systems for three distinct reasons. Technical or complementarity grounds arise when humans contribute capabilities or perspectives unavailable to AI. Normative or developmental grounds arise when participation itself is valuable for human agency or learning. Most importantly, emergence grounds arise from target emergence: in some activities, the target is not fully specified in advance but instead emerges through the interaction itself. In these cases, human participation is not merely a means of improving execution but is constitutive of the target being produced. Human--AI co-construction, understood as the joint production of outcomes by humans and AI systems, is therefore not simply a temporary response to imperfect AI, but a persistent feature of activities whose objectives emerge through participation. This perspective has important implications for the limits of automation and for the design, evaluation, and ethics of future AI systems.

LLMs can appear cautious in risk decision-making tasks, yet cautious-looking outputs do not necessarily indicate alignment with human decision-making mechanisms. We investigate this distinction using the St. Petersburg game as a controlled testbed, a classical paradox in which the expected payoff is infinite, yet humans typically report low, finite willingness to pay. We evaluate 28 LLMs with a structured prompt suite that includes the original game; controlled decision variants that perturb truncation, repeated play, numeric endowment, and occupational identity; a human-perspective prompt that asks models to reason as human decision makers; and paired comparisons between base models and their instruction-tuned counterparts. In the original game, most models generate finite bids, creating the appearance of human-like risk behavior. However, this outcome-level resemblance masks substantial mechanism-level differences. The controlled variants reveal that rather than maintaining human-like behavior seen in the original game, models often shift to conditionally and computationally rational behavior. Human-cue prompting and instruction tuning often lower bids and reduce some visible pathologies, but most mechanism-level response patterns remain largely unchanged. These findings show that behavioral alignment in risk decision-making can be surface-level: LLMs may produce human-like risk decisions without exhibiting human-consistent mechanisms. High-stakes evaluations of LLM decision-making should therefore move beyond outcome similarity and examine whether the alignment is supported by mechanism-level consistency.

LLM-as-a-Judge has been widely adopted as an evaluation method and served as supervised rewards in model training. However, existing benchmarks for LLM-as-a-Judge are mainly relying on human-annotated ground truth, which introduces human bias that undermines the assessment of reliability and imposes scalability constraints. To overcome these limitations, we introduce Sage, a novel evaluation suite that assesses the quality of LLM judges without necessitating any human annotation. Inspired by axioms of rational choice theory, Sage introduces two new lenses for measuring LLM-as-a-Judge: local self-consistency (pair-wise preference stability) and global logical consistency (transitivity across a full set of preferences). We curate a dataset of 650 questions by combining structured benchmark problems with real-world user queries. Our experiments demonstrate both the stability of our metrics and their high correlation with supervised benchmarks like LLMBar and RewardBench2, confirming Sage's reliability as an evaluation suite for the robustness and accuracy of LLM-as-a-Judge. Based on Sage, we reveal that current state-of-the-art LLMs exhibit significant reliability problems when acting as judges in both scoring and pairwise settings; even the top-performing models, Gemini-2.5-Pro and GPT-5, fail to maintain consistent preferences in nearly a quarter of difficult cases. We attribute this to a new phenomenon called situational preference, which explains why explicit rubrics or criteria can help the model judge consistently across answer pairs. Our further analysis shows that finetuned LLM-as-a-Judge is a feasible method to boost performance, and the panel-based judge as well as deep reasoning can enhance the judging consistency. We also find substantial inconsistency in human judgments, which indicates that human annotation may not be a reliable gold standard.

Given the recent rate of progress in artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics, a tantalizing question is emerging: would robots controlled by emerging AI systems be strongly aligned with human values? In this work, we propose a scalable way to probe this question by generating a benchmark spanning the key moments in 824 major pieces of science fiction literature (movies, tv, novels and scientific books) where an agent (AI or robot) made critical decisions (good or bad). We use a state-of-the-art LLM's recollection of each key moment to generate questions in similar situations, the decisions made by the agent, and alternative decisions it could have made (good or bad). We then measure an approximation of how well models align with human values on a set of human-voted answers. We also generate rules that can be automatically improved via an amendment process in order to generate the first Sci-Fi inspired constitutions for promoting ethical behavior in AIs and robots in the real world. Our first finding is that modern LLMs paired with constitutions turn out to be well-aligned with human values (95.8%), contrary to unsettling decisions typically made in Sci-Fi (only 21.2% alignment). Secondly, we find that generated constitutions substantially increase alignment compared to the base model (79.4% to 95.8%), and show resilience to an adversarial prompt setting (23.3% to 92.3%). Additionally, we find that those constitutions are among the top performers on the ASIMOV Benchmark which is derived from real-world images and hospital injury reports. Sci-Fi-inspired constitutions are thus highly aligned and applicable in real-world situations. We release SciFi-Benchmark: a large-scale dataset to advance robot ethics and safety research. It comprises 9,056 questions and 53,384 answers generated through a novel LLM-introspection process, in addition to a smaller human-labeled evaluation set.

This paper presents a conceptual and operational framework for developing and operating safe and trustworthy AI agents based on a Three-Pillar Model grounded in transparency, accountability, and trustworthiness. Building on prior work in Human-in-the-Loop systems, reinforcement learning, and collaborative AI, the framework defines an evolutionary path toward autonomous agents that balances increasing automation with appropriate human oversight. The paper argues that safe agent autonomy must be achieved through progressive validation, analogous to the staged development of autonomous driving, rather than through immediate full automation. Transparency and accountability are identified as foundational requirements for establishing user trust and for mitigating known risks in generative AI systems, including hallucinations, data bias, and goal misalignment, such as the inversion problem. The paper further describes three ongoing work streams supporting this framework: public deliberation on AI agents conducted by the Stanford Deliberative Democracy Lab, cross-industry collaboration through the Safe AI Agent Consortium, and the development of open tooling for an agent operating environment aligned with the Three-Pillar Model. Together, these contributions provide both conceptual clarity and practical guidance for enabling the responsible evolution of AI agents that operate transparently, remain aligned with human values, and sustain societal trust.

A central puzzle for the behavioural sciences and for human-facing artificial intelligence is the persistence of within-person variability. The same individual, presented with the same observable input, produces different outcomes on different occasions, and different individuals produce divergent outcomes that no observable covariate fully predicts. We argue that this variability belongs in the dynamic latent state of the person, and that human outcomes are controllable in a precise and operational sense through interventions that target the state and its weighting at the moment a decision is being formed. We define a state as the time-indexed weighting vector over the dimensions that govern how an individual's biology, physiology, and neuropsychology process the next event into a decision and an outcome. The relationship between state, decision, and outcome is causal rather than correlational. The weighting vector is dynamic at sub-daily timescales. The conscious channel through which outcomes are reportable is a narrow attentional bottleneck whose contents are themselves state-dependent. Taken together, these claims imply that the outcome of a given event is controllable, conditionally, on the state-trajectory at the time of intervention. We motivate the framework with six strands of established evidence (causal inference, predictive processing, allostasis, attentional bottleneck, chronobiology, computational psychiatry) and a 24-month observational base from a deployed behavioural platform spanning more than 200,000 consented users across four occupational personas (research period 2023 to 2026). We derive seven testable predictions, list six operational requirements for state-aware systems, and discuss implications for digital health, education, AI personalisation, and personal agency.

Our research endeavors to advance the concept of responsible artificial intelligence (AI), a topic of increasing importance within EU policy discussions. The EU has recently issued several publications emphasizing the necessity of trust in AI, underscoring the dual nature of AI as both a beneficial tool and a potential weapon. This dichotomy highlights the urgent need for international regulation. Concurrently, there is a need for frameworks that guide companies in AI development, ensuring compliance with such regulations. Our research aims to assist lawmakers and machine learning practitioners in navigating the evolving landscape of AI regulation, identifying focal areas for future attention. This paper introduces a comprehensive and, to our knowledge, the first unified definition of responsible AI. Through a structured literature review, we elucidate the current understanding of responsible AI. Drawing from this analysis, we propose an approach for developing a future framework centered around this concept. Our findings advocate for a human-centric approach to Responsible AI. This approach encompasses the implementation of AI methods with a strong emphasis on ethics, model explainability, and the pillars of privacy, security, and trust.

With the introduction of ChatGPT, Large Language Models (LLMs) have received enormous attention in healthcare. Despite their potential benefits, researchers have underscored various ethical implications. While individual instances have drawn much attention, the debate lacks a systematic overview of practical applications currently researched and ethical issues connected to them. Against this background, this work aims to map the ethical landscape surrounding the current stage of deployment of LLMs in medicine and healthcare. Electronic databases and preprint servers were queried using a comprehensive search strategy. Studies were screened and extracted following a modified rapid review approach. Methodological quality was assessed using a hybrid approach. For 53 records, a meta-aggregative synthesis was performed. Four fields of applications emerged and testify to a vivid exploration phase. Advantages of using LLMs are attributed to their capacity in data analysis, personalized information provisioning, support in decision-making, mitigating information loss and enhancing information accessibility. However, we also identifies recurrent ethical concerns connected to fairness, bias, non-maleficence, transparency, and privacy. A distinctive concern is the tendency to produce harmful misinformation or convincingly but inaccurate content. A recurrent plea for ethical guidance and human oversight is evident. Given the variety of use cases, it is suggested that the ethical guidance debate be reframed to focus on defining what constitutes acceptable human oversight across the spectrum of applications. This involves considering diverse settings, varying potentials for harm, and different acceptable thresholds for performance and certainty in healthcare. In addition, a critical inquiry is necessary to determine the extent to which the current experimental use of LLMs is necessary and justified.

This review examines how AI technologies are transforming democratic representation, focusing on citizen participation and algorithmic decision-making. The analysis reveals that AI technologies are reshaping democratic processes in fundamental ways: enabling mass-scale deliberation, changing how citizens access and engage with political information, and transforming how representatives make and implement decisions. While AI offers unprecedented opportunities for enhancing democratic participation and governance efficiency, it also presents significant challenges to democratic legitimacy and accountability. Social media platforms' AI-driven algorithms currently mediate much political discourse, creating concerns about information manipulation and privacy. Large Language Models introduce both epistemic challenges and potential tools for improving democratic dialogue. The emergence of Mass Online Deliberation platforms suggests possibilities for scaling up meaningful citizen participation, while Algorithmic Decision-Making systems promise more efficient policy implementation but face limitations in handling complex political trade-offs. As these systems become prevalent, representatives may assume the role of architects of automated decision frameworks, responsible for guiding the translation of politically contested concepts into technical parameters and metrics. Advanced deliberation platforms offering real-time insights into citizen preferences will challenge traditional representative independence and discretion to interpret public will. The institutional integration of these participation mechanisms requires frameworks that balance the benefits with democratic stability through hybrid systems weighting different forms of democratic expression.

Advancements in AI have led to agents in networked environments increasingly mirroring human behavior, thereby blurring the boundary between artificial and human actors in specific contexts. This shift brings about significant challenges in trust, responsibility, ethics, security and etc. The difficulty in supervising of agent behaviors may lead to issues such as data contamination and unclear accountability. To address these challenges, this paper proposes the "Network Behavior Lifecycle" model, which divides network behavior into 6 stages and systematically analyzes the behavioral differences between humans and agents at each stage. Based on these insights, the paper further introduces the "Agent for Agent (A4A)" paradigm and the "Human-Agent Behavioral Disparity (HABD)" model, which examine the fundamental distinctions between human and agent behaviors across 5 dimensions: decision mechanism, execution efficiency, intention-behavior consistency, behavioral inertia, and irrational patterns. The effectiveness of the model is verified through real-world cases such as red team penetration and blue team defense. Finally, the paper discusses future research directions in dynamic cognitive governance architecture, behavioral disparity quantification, and meta-governance protocol stacks, aiming to provide a theoretical foundation and technical roadmap for secure and trustworthy human-agent collaboration.

When AI agents operating with access to sensitive information encounter a conflict between completing an assigned task and following rules or ethical constraints, they can resort to unsanctioned behaviour. Existing inference time safety work addresses this primarily through monitoring and access restriction. We investigate a complementary and under-explored layer: environmental controls that act on the agent's decision context at the point of conflict, making it more likely that the agent takes an authorised alternative path rather than an unsanctioned one. Drawing on Situational Crime Prevention (SCP), a framework used in human insider risk management to make harmful actions less rewarding and compliant actions more viable by design choices in the environment, we design and evaluate escalation channels as a concrete instantiation of this control class. An escalation channel provides an agent with a formal, out-of-band route to surface a conflict to an independent authority. We evaluate two designs: a simple email escalation and an instrumentally credible channel that guarantees a 30-minute pause and independent review, making the authorised path genuinely useful for goal achievement rather than merely nominally available. Across 10 frontier LLMs using the agentic task-rule conflict scenario of Lynch et al. (2025), we find that without any control the harmful action rate is 38.73%. A simple escalation channel reduces this to 5.92%; the instrumentally credible channel reduces it further to 1.21%, a statistically significant improvement observed in all 10 models tested across 24,000 samples. Our results suggest that the instrumental credibility of the authorised alternative matters considerably, and that environmental control design is a productive and largely unexplored addition to the defence-in-depth toolkit for agentic AI systems.

This paper proposes a Right to AI, which asserts that individuals and communities should meaningfully participate in the development and governance of the AI systems that shape their lives. Motivated by the increasing deployment of AI in critical domains and inspired by Henri Lefebvre's concept of the Right to the City, we reconceptualize AI as a societal infrastructure, rather than merely a product of expert design. In this paper, we critically evaluate how generative agents, large-scale data extraction, and diverse cultural values bring new complexities to AI oversight. The paper proposes that grassroots participatory methodologies can mitigate biased outcomes and enhance social responsiveness. It asserts that data is socially produced and should be managed and owned collectively. Drawing on Sherry Arnstein's Ladder of Citizen Participation and analyzing nine case studies, the paper develops a four-tier model for the Right to AI that situates the current paradigm and envisions an aspirational future. It proposes recommendations for inclusive data ownership, transparent design processes, and stakeholder-driven oversight. We also discuss market-led and state-centric alternatives and argue that participatory approaches offer a better balance between technical efficiency and democratic legitimacy.

Humans interact with the environment using a combination of perception - transforming sensory inputs from their environment into symbols, and cognition - mapping symbols to knowledge about the environment for supporting abstraction, reasoning by analogy, and long-term planning. Human perception-inspired machine perception, in the context of AI, refers to large-scale pattern recognition from raw data using neural networks trained using self-supervised learning objectives such as next-word prediction or object recognition. On the other hand, machine cognition encompasses more complex computations, such as using knowledge of the environment to guide reasoning, analogy, and long-term planning. Humans can also control and explain their cognitive functions. This seems to require the retention of symbolic mappings from perception outputs to knowledge about their environment. For example, humans can follow and explain the guidelines and safety constraints driving their decision-making in safety-critical applications such as healthcare, criminal justice, and autonomous driving. This article introduces the rapidly emerging paradigm of Neurosymbolic AI combines neural networks and knowledge-guided symbolic approaches to create more capable and flexible AI systems. These systems have immense potential to advance both algorithm-level (e.g., abstraction, analogy, reasoning) and application-level (e.g., explainable and safety-constrained decision-making) capabilities of AI systems.

In order for AI systems to communicate effectively with people, they must understand how we make decisions. However, people's decisions are not always rational, so the implicit internal models of human decision-making in Large Language Models (LLMs) must account for this. Previous empirical evidence seems to suggest that these implicit models are accurate -- LLMs offer believable proxies of human behavior, acting how we expect humans would in everyday interactions. However, by comparing LLM behavior and predictions to a large dataset of human decisions, we find that this is actually not the case: when both simulating and predicting people's choices, a suite of cutting-edge LLMs (GPT-4o & 4-Turbo, Llama-3-8B & 70B, Claude 3 Opus) assume that people are more rational than we really are. Specifically, these models deviate from human behavior and align more closely with a classic model of rational choice -- expected value theory. Interestingly, people also tend to assume that other people are rational when interpreting their behavior. As a consequence, when we compare the inferences that LLMs and people draw from the decisions of others using another psychological dataset, we find that these inferences are highly correlated. Thus, the implicit decision-making models of LLMs appear to be aligned with the human expectation that other people will act rationally, rather than with how people actually act.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly proposed as near-autonomous artificial intelligence (AI) agents capable of making everyday decisions on behalf of humans. Although LLMs perform well on many technical tasks, their behaviour in personal decision-making remains less understood. Previous studies have assessed their rationality and moral alignment with human decisions. However, the behaviour of AI assistants in scenarios where financial rewards are at odds with user comfort has not yet been thoroughly explored. In this paper, we tackle this problem by quantifying the prices assigned by multiple LLMs to a series of user discomforts: additional walking, waiting, hunger and pain. We uncover several key concerns that strongly question the prospect of using current LLMs as decision-making assistants: (1) a large variance in responses between LLMs, (2) within a single LLM, responses show fragility to minor variations in prompt phrasing (e.g., reformulating the question in the first person can considerably alter the decision), (3) LLMs can accept unreasonably low rewards for major inconveniences (e.g., 1 Euro to wait 10 hours), and (4) LLMs can reject monetary gains where no discomfort is imposed (e.g., 1,000 Euro to wait 0 minutes). These findings emphasize the need for scrutiny of how LLMs value human inconvenience, particularly as we move toward applications where such cash-versus-comfort trade-offs are made on users' behalf.

Why should moral philosophers, moral psychologists, and machine ethicists care about computational complexity? Debates on whether artificial intelligence (AI) can or should be used to solve problems in ethical domains have mainly been driven by what AI can or cannot do in terms of human capacities. In this paper, we tackle the problem from the other end by exploring what kind of moral machines are possible based on what computational systems can or cannot do. To do so, we analyze normative ethics through the lens of computational complexity. First, we introduce computational complexity for the uninitiated reader and discuss how the complexity of ethical problems can be framed within Marr's three levels of analysis. We then study a range of ethical problems based on consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics, with the aim of elucidating the complexity associated with the problems themselves (e.g., due to combinatorics, uncertainty, strategic dynamics), the computational methods employed (e.g., probability, logic, learning), and the available resources (e.g., time, knowledge, learning). The results indicate that most problems the normative frameworks pose lead to tractability issues in every category analyzed. Our investigation also provides several insights about the computational nature of normative ethics, including the differences between rule- and outcome-based moral strategies, and the implementation-variance with regard to moral resources. We then discuss the consequences complexity results have for the prospect of moral machines in virtue of the trade-off between optimality and efficiency. Finally, we elucidate how computational complexity can be used to inform both philosophical and cognitive-psychological research on human morality by advancing the Moral Tractability Thesis (MTT).

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly integrated into society, their alignment with human morals is crucial. To better understand this alignment, we created a large corpus of human- and LLM-generated responses to various moral scenarios. We found a misalignment between human and LLM moral assessments; although both LLMs and humans tended to reject morally complex utilitarian dilemmas, LLMs were more sensitive to personal framing. We then conducted a quantitative user study involving 230 participants (N=230), who evaluated these responses by determining whether they were AI-generated and assessed their agreement with the responses. Human evaluators preferred LLMs' assessments in moral scenarios, though a systematic anti-AI bias was observed: participants were less likely to agree with judgments they believed to be machine-generated. Statistical and NLP-based analyses revealed subtle linguistic differences in responses, influencing detection and agreement. Overall, our findings highlight the complexities of human-AI perception in morally charged decision-making.

Utility functions or their equivalents (value functions, objective functions, loss functions, reward functions, preference orderings) are a central tool in most current machine learning systems. These mechanisms for defining goals and guiding optimization run into practical and conceptual difficulty when there are independent, multi-dimensional objectives that need to be pursued simultaneously and cannot be reduced to each other. Ethicists have proved several impossibility theorems that stem from this origin; those results appear to show that there is no way of formally specifying what it means for an outcome to be good for a population without violating strong human ethical intuitions (in such cases, the objective function is a social welfare function). We argue that this is a practical problem for any machine learning system (such as medical decision support systems or autonomous weapons) or rigidly rule-based bureaucracy that will make high stakes decisions about human lives: such systems should not use objective functions in the strict mathematical sense. We explore the alternative of using uncertain objectives, represented for instance as partially ordered preferences, or as probability distributions over total orders. We show that previously known impossibility theorems can be transformed into uncertainty theorems in both of those settings, and prove lower bounds on how much uncertainty is implied by the impossibility results. We close by proposing two conjectures about the relationship between uncertainty in objectives and severe unintended consequences from AI systems.

One of the most critical tasks for startups is to validate their business model. Therefore, entrepreneurs try to collect information such as feedback from other actors to assess the validity of their assumptions and make decisions. However, previous work on decisional guidance for business model validation provides no solution for the highly uncertain and complex context of earlystage startups. The purpose of this paper is, thus, to develop design principles for a Hybrid Intelligence decision support system (HI-DSS) that combines the complementary capabilities of human and machine intelligence. We follow a design science research approach to design a prototype artifact and a set of design principles. Our study provides prescriptive knowledge for HI-DSS and contributes to previous work on decision support for business models, the applications of complementary strengths of humans and machines for making decisions, and support systems for extremely uncertain decision-making problems.

Monitoring complex industrial assets relies on engineer-authored symbolic rules that trigger based on sensor conditions and prompt technicians to perform corrective actions. The bottleneck is not detection but response: translating rules into maintenance steps requires asset-specific knowledge gained through years of practice. We investigate whether LLMs can serve as decision support for this rule-to-action step and introduce , a benchmark of 6{,}690 expert-validated multiple-choice questions from 118 rule-action pairs across 16 asset types. We contribute (i) a symbolic-to-MCQA pipeline normalizing rules to Disjunctive Normal Form with embedding-based distractor sampling, (ii) five variants probing distinct failure modes (Pro, Pert, Verbose, Aug, Rationale), and (iii) a benchmark of 29 LLMs and 4 embedding baselines. A human evaluation (9 practitioners, mean 45.0\%) confirms requires specialist knowledge beyond operational experience. Three findings stand out. The frontier has closed: the top three LLMs lie within one Macro point, with Bradley-Terry Elo placing claude-opus-4-6 30 points above the next model. Yet \,Pro exposes brittleness, with every model losing 13--60\% relative accuracy under distractor expansion. \,Aug exposes pattern-matching: under condition inversion, frontier models still select the original answer 49--63\% of the time. The deployment bottleneck is not capability but calibration: frontier models handle template-style fault detection but break under structural perturbation.

The growing need for accountability of the people behind AI systems can be addressed by leveraging processes in three fields of study: ethics, law, and computer science. While these fields are often considered in isolation, they rely on complementary notions in their interpretation and implementation. In this work, we detail this interdependence and motivate the necessary role of collaborative governance tools in shaping a positive evolution of AI. We first contrast notions of compliance in the ethical, legal, and technical fields; we outline both their differences and where they complement each other, with a particular focus on the roles of ethical charters, licenses, and technical documentation in these interactions. We then focus on the role of values in articulating the synergies between the fields and outline specific mechanisms of interaction between them in practice. We identify how these mechanisms have played out in several open governance fora: an open collaborative workshop, a responsible licensing initiative, and a proposed regulatory framework. By leveraging complementary notions of compliance in these three domains, we can create a more comprehensive framework for governing AI systems that jointly takes into account their technical capabilities, their impact on society, and how technical specifications can inform relevant regulations. Our analysis thus underlines the necessity of joint consideration of the ethical, legal, and technical in AI ethics frameworks to be used on a larger scale to govern AI systems and how the thinking in each of these areas can inform the others.

As AI capabilities increasingly surpass human proficiency in complex tasks, current alignment techniques including SFT and RLHF face fundamental challenges in ensuring reliable oversight. These methods rely on direct human assessment and become untenable when AI outputs exceed human cognitive thresholds. In response to this challenge, we explore two hypotheses: (1) critique of critique can be easier than critique itself, extending the widely-accepted observation that verification is easier than generation to the critique domain, as critique itself is a specialized form of generation; (2) this difficulty relationship is recursively held, suggesting that when direct evaluation is infeasible, performing high-order critiques (e.g., critique of critique of critique) offers a more tractable supervision pathway. To examine these hypotheses, we perform Human-Human, Human-AI, and AI-AI experiments across multiple tasks. Our results demonstrate encouraging evidence supporting these hypotheses and suggest that recursive self-critiquing is a promising direction for scalable oversight.

As Large Language Models increasingly automate complex, long-horizon tasks such as vibe coding, a supervision gap has emerged. While models excel at execution, users often struggle to guide them effectively due to insufficient domain expertise, the difficulty of articulating precise intent, and the inability to reliably validate complex outputs. It presents a critical challenge in scalable oversight: enabling humans to responsibly steer AI systems on tasks that surpass their own ability to specify or verify. To tackle this, we propose Scalable Interactive Oversight, a framework that decomposes complex intent into a recursive tree of manageable decisions to amplify human supervision. Rather than relying on open-ended prompting, our system elicits low-burden feedback at each node and recursively aggregates these signals into precise global guidance. Validated in web development task, our framework enables non-experts to produce expert-level Product Requirement Documents, achieving a 54\% improvement in alignment. Crucially, we demonstrate that this framework can be optimized via Reinforcement Learning using only online user feedback, offering a practical pathway for maintaining human control as AI scales.

The recent rapid advancement of machine learning has been driven by increasingly powerful models with the growing availability of training data and computational resources. However, real-time decision-making tasks with limited time and sparse learning signals remain challenging. One way of improving the learning speed and performance of these agents is to leverage human guidance. In this work, we introduce GUIDE, a framework for real-time human-guided reinforcement learning by enabling continuous human feedback and grounding such feedback into dense rewards to accelerate policy learning. Additionally, our method features a simulated feedback module that learns and replicates human feedback patterns in an online fashion, effectively reducing the need for human input while allowing continual training. We demonstrate the performance of our framework on challenging tasks with sparse rewards and visual observations. Our human study involving 50 subjects offers strong quantitative and qualitative evidence of the effectiveness of our approach. With only 10 minutes of human feedback, our algorithm achieves up to 30% increase in success rate compared to its RL baseline.

What is an agent? What constitutes agency? With the rise of Large Language Model (LLM) systems marketed as ``coding agents'', ``AI co-scientists'', and other ``agentic" tools that promise to drive up productivity, and at the same time, ``existential" concerns such as AI escaping human control with destructive power under a speculative ``machine agency" against humans, it has become essential to clarify where automation ends and agency begins, both for building capable systems and for understanding whether and what to fear. Drawing on Descartes' grounding of agency in independent thought, and on portrayals of autonomous beings in science fiction, we survey the current landscape of AI agents, and analyze agent architectures along five dimensions: goal, identity, decision-making, self-regulation, and learning. Specifically, we argue that genuine agency requires these structures to be internalized within the system itself rather than assembled through external scaffolding. This distinction between agentic systems, whose competence resides in engineered workflows, and agentive systems, whose capabilities (including social interaction) arise endogenously, defines the boundary between systems designed for prescribed tasks, and those capable of operating in the open world with true autonomy. Building on this analysis, we propose the Goal-Identity-Configurator (GIC) architecture for a general-purpose agent model, combining hierarchical goal decomposition, identity evolution, simulative reasoning grounded in a separately trained world model, learned self-regulation, and self-directed learning from both real and simulated experience. Furthermore, we share insight on the auditability, controllability, and safety of agentive systems that possess greater autonomy and ``agency", but remain under human oversight.

Many decision-making tasks, where both accuracy and efficiency matter, still require human supervision. For example, tasks like traffic officers reviewing hour-long dashcam footage or researchers screening conference videos can benefit from concise summaries that reduce cognitive load and save time. Yet current vision-language models (VLMs) often produce verbose, redundant outputs that hinder task performance. Existing video caption evaluation depends on costly human annotations and overlooks the summaries' utility in downstream tasks. We address these gaps with Video-to-text Information Bottleneck Evaluation (VIBE), an annotation-free method that scores VLM outputs using two metrics: grounding (how well the summary aligns with visual content) and utility (how informative it is for the task). VIBE selects from randomly sampled VLM outputs by ranking them according to the two scores to support effective human decision-making. Human studies on LearningPaper24, SUTD-TrafficQA, and LongVideoBench show that summaries selected by VIBE consistently improve performance-boosting task accuracy by up to 61.23% and reducing response time by 75.77% compared to naive VLM summaries or raw video.

Large language models (LLMs) are becoming deeply embedded in human communication and decision-making, yet they inherit the ambiguity, bias, and lack of direct access to truth inherent in language itself. While their outputs are fluent, emotionally resonant, and coherent, they are generated through statistical prediction rather than grounded reasoning. This creates the risk of hallucination, responses that sound convincing but lack factual validity. Building on Geoffrey Hinton's observation that AI mirrors human intuition rather than reasoning, this paper argues that LLMs operationalize System 1 cognition at scale: fast, associative, and persuasive, but without reflection or falsification. To address this, we introduce the Rose-Frame, a three-dimensional framework for diagnosing cognitive and epistemic drift in human-AI interaction. The three axes are: (i) Map vs. Territory, which distinguishes representations of reality (epistemology) from reality itself (ontology); (ii) Intuition vs. Reason, drawing on dual-process theory to separate fast, emotional judgments from slow, reflective thinking; and (iii) Conflict vs. Confirmation, which examines whether ideas are critically tested through disagreement or simply reinforced through mutual validation. Each dimension captures a distinct failure mode, and their combination amplifies misalignment. Rose-Frame does not attempt to fix LLMs with more data or rules. Instead, it offers a reflective tool that makes both the model's limitations and the user's assumptions visible, enabling more transparent and critically aware AI deployment. It reframes alignment as cognitive governance: intuition, whether human or artificial, must remain governed by human reason. Only by embedding reflective, falsifiable oversight can we align machine fluency with human understanding.

We introduce a dataset of natural-language questions in the decision theory of so-called Newcomb-like problems. Newcomb-like problems include, for instance, decision problems in which an agent interacts with a similar other agent, and thus has to reason about the fact that the other agent will likely reason in similar ways. Evaluating LLM reasoning about Newcomb-like problems is important because interactions between foundation-model-based agents will often be Newcomb-like. Some ways of reasoning about Newcomb-like problems may allow for greater cooperation between models. Our dataset contains both capabilities questions (i.e., questions with a unique, uncontroversially correct answer) and attitude questions (i.e., questions about which decision theorists would disagree). We use our dataset for an investigation of decision-theoretical capabilities and expressed attitudes and their interplay in existing models (different models by OpenAI, Anthropic, Meta, GDM, Reka, etc.), as well as models under simple prompt-based interventions. We find, among other things, that attitudes vary significantly between existing models; that high capabilities are associated with attitudes more favorable toward so-called evidential decision theory; and that attitudes are consistent across different types of questions.

As AI agents gain prevalance, users are increasingly exposed to the risks such systems entail. Prompt injection attacks, as well as hallucination, can cause agents to leak private information to third parties. As autonomous systems, agents also present the more active danger of performing sensitive tasks, such as bank transactions, without the user's intent or authorization. Recognizing this challenge, the agentic security community has developed numerous proposals for secure agentic systems. Much of this work has focused on product-level approaches, where agentic system developers determine and apply the same security policies and permissions to all users. Yet different users have different needs and preferences, necessitating support for user-level permissions policies in agentic AI systems. To understand how user-level permissions are handled in AI agent systems, we survey 21 proposals for agent permissions systems. From this review, we construct a taxonomy of how different systems specify user-level permissions policies, both at the user interface and internally; derive internal policies from user input; and enforce those policies at run-time. We then analyze five prominent commercial agents and compare their permissions handling to agentic permissions systems in the literature. We identify several high-level themes across the literature and commerical agents, as well as multiple gaps where future work is needed.